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ABSTRACT
THE INDIRECT EFFECTS OF CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFER PROGRAMS: AN
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF FAMILIAS EN ACCION

By
MONICA OSPINA
May, 2010

Committee Chair: Dr. Ragan Petrie
Major Department: Economics
Conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs have become the most important social
policy in Latin America, and their influence has spread to countries around the world. A
number of studies provide strong evidence of the positive impacts of these programs on
the main targeted outcomes, education and health, and have proved successful in other
outcomes such as nutrition, household income, and child labor. As we expect CCT
programs to remain a permanent aspect of social policy for the foreseeable future,
demand for evidence of the indirect effects of CCT programs has grown beyond the
initial emphasis of these programs. My research pays particular attention to these relevant
but unintended outcomes, which have been discussed less extensively in the literature.
Familias en Accion (FA), a CCT program in Colombia, started operating in 2002
and has benefited approximately 1,500,000 households since its beginning. The results of
the program’s evaluation survey, representative of poor rural households in Colombia, are
a very good source or investigating not only the unintended effects of the program but
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also the microeconomic behavior of poor households and social policy issues in the
country. Using a panel dataset from FA, I address three empirical policy questions: (i) to
what extent is consumption of beneficiary households better insured against income
shocks? (ii) has the program displaced child labor as a risk-coping instrument?, and (iii)
are there any incentive effects of the cash transfers and the associated conditionalities on
the labor supply of adults in recipient households?
Each of my research questions is addressed separately; however, the results, taken
together, can be informative in understanding the safety net value of the program and
their potentialities to reduce poverty in the long term. I find that the program serves as an
instrument for consumption smoothing. In particular, FA is effective in protecting food
consumption, but not nonfood consumption, and it reduces consumption fluctuations in
response to idiosyncratic shocks but not to covariate shocks. Results also reveal that FA
works as insurance for the schooling of the poor but is not able to completely displace
child labor. Finally, the results also show that beneficiary mothers are devoting more time
to household chores and that girls and female adult labor are complementary. Male labor
supply has increased while boys have increased leisure time as a response to the program.
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Chapter 1 . CCT PROGRAMS FOR CONSUMPTION INSURANCE: EVIDENCE
FROM COLOMBIA

Introduction
Poor households in developing countries live with high levels of risk and limited
access to formal financial systems for credit and insurance. To secure their levels of
consumption, or smooth consumption, households have traditionally engaged in different
ex-post risk coping strategies; i.e., depletion of assets, increase of labor supply, informal
borrowing, or transfers from relatives. Also, risk-averse households can take ex-ante
actions to mitigate the effects of negative income shocks; i.e., income smoothing.
However, neither of these alternatives allows poor households to achieve an optimal
allocation of risk across time, and most of these strategies are costly in terms of long-term
poverty and vulnerability. In particular, ex-post consumption smoothing strategies might
result in households’ decreased capital accumulation, and the income-smoothing
mechanism might result in reduced investments in productive assets. Thus, the inability
of households to cope with risk is a channel through which they can get into a poverty
trap. For these reasons, the research on risk coping behavior and consumption smoothing
arrangements of poor communities in developing countries is a crucial issue in the
formulation of policies aimed to reduce poverty.
The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, we analyze the degree of consumption
insurance of poor households in Colombia in relation to fluctuations in their incomes due
to idiosyncratic and community shocks.1 Second, we evaluate the effects that a

1

Idiosyncratic shocks affect only particular households while covariate shocks affect a community as
a whole.
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conditional cash transfer program (CCTs), Familias en Acción (FA), has had on
protecting households from the negative effects of shocks. By doing this, we hope to
contribute to the literature of consumption smoothing in developing countries as well as
to provide new evidence of the role of CCTs as risk management instruments. A good
understanding of how and which public interventions provide effective insurance is
crucial for policy design.
Economics literature has broadly studied how individuals smooth consumption in
response to income shocks. Two main hypotheses have dominated the literature. On one
hand, the full risk-sharing hypothesis assumes that consumption is fully insured against
idiosyncratic income shocks but not against community income shocks. On the other
hand, the permanent income hypothesis (PIH) assumes that, under complete credit
markets, self-insurance through borrowing and saving may allow inter-temporal
consumption smoothing against idiosyncratic and covariate shocks. Although both
hypotheses have been rejected repeatedly (e.g., Townsend 1994; Ravallion and
Chaudhuri 1997; Deaton 1992; Skoufias 2003), empirical evidence has shown that
consumption reacts too little to permanent income shocks to be consistent with the
economic theory (Campbell & Deaton, 1989; Attanasio & Pavoni, 2006). Because these
models are extreme characterizations of individual and market behavior, recent literature
has addressed the issue of whether partial consumption insurance is available to agents.
This paper, in addition to following the traditional approach of testing the hypotheses of
complete consumption insurance, estimates partial insurance parameters from the data
following the model of partial insurance proposed by Blundell et al. (2008).

2

In addition to identifying the relationship between consumption smoothing and
income shocks, we give special attention to how public interventions—CCTs, in
particular—can play a significant role in reducing consumption vulnerability of poor
households. According to Morduch (1999), CCTs guarantee that a minimum of insurance
is received in order to compensate for under-provision of safety-net services in poor
areas. There are several ways in which we can expect CCT programs to reduce the risk of
vulnerability: They can (1) reduce income fluctuations because they increase income
irrespective of shocks and thus have the same insurance properties as permanent income;
(2) displace non-desirable coping strategies, such as high-interest loans, child labor, or
depletion of productive assets; (3) create a regulatory and institutional framework to scale
up services through informal safety nets; and (4) counteract the government’s lack of
ability to respond, whether at the central or local level (Cox & Jimenez, 1992).
FA provides subsidies to families on the conditions that all household members
receive periodic health checks and that all children are enrolled in and attend school
regularly. Given the importance of the program at a national level, a rigorous impact
evaluation design has been followed since the very early stages of the program. This has
allowed for the collection of repeated observations of beneficiary households surveyed
before and after the implementation of the program, as well as the collection of similar
data from comparable households that have not been covered by the program. Thus, this
panel dataset provides an excellent opportunity for measuring consumption insurance and
reveals possible roles of public interventions as risk management instruments. This study
has some advantages over other similar studies because of the quasi-experimental design
of the program it studies and because of the comprehensive data collected from the
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program’s evaluation survey. First, the balanced panel dataset has detailed information on
consumption, income, and shocks for a representative sample of poor households living
in small villages in Colombia. Most of the datasets used in earlier studies to evaluate
consumption smoothing report either income or consumption, not both. For example, in
order to estimate partial insurance parameters for the United States, Blundell et al. (2008)
have to infer consumption statistically, since consumption and income data are not
available for the same households in a single dataset.
Second, while some studies use changes in income as measures of shocks
(Skoufias, 2003; Townsend, 2004), others use dummy variables for the occurrence of
idiosyncratic shocks in a given period of time (Cochane, 1991; Mace, 1991). Although
income has been criticized as a right hand side variable since it can be endogenous in the
consumption equation (Cochane, 1991), if we are able to control for that endogeneity,
income variance at household and community levels are very informative about the
degree of consumption insurance of poor households. Furthermore, as frequency and
intensity of shock events are difficult to capture in occurrence shocks data, a better
understanding of the vulnerability to shocks is obtained when we are able to complement
these results using income variance and shock events as measures of the risk faced by
these households. The dataset used in this analysis uses both income variance and shock
events to estimate consumption insurance parameters. Finally, as we have data for
treatment and control households before the program was implemented, we are able to
estimate an unbiased effect of the program on consumption smoothing, controlling for
any pretreatment differences, and for time variant differences at the municipality level.

4

This paper makes three important contributions to the existing literature. First, it
adds to the empirical literature on consumption insurance by providing evidence of the
ability of poor households in Colombia to insure consumption against idiosyncratic and
covariate shocks. Prior evidence of consumption smoothing has been limited to results
from a particular dataset from India2 and a few other samples collected mainly in Asia
and Africa (Baez, 2006). Latin America, a region with a massive proportion of people
living in poverty who are subject to income shocks, is clearly underrepresented in this
literature, in large part due to the lack of suitable information for investigating risk and
insurance of poor households. Second, it contributes to the social program evaluation
literature by going beyond assessing the impact of the program on its main objectives to
analyze the consequences of participation in other dimensions, such as the degree of
informal risk sharing. Third, it is the first paper, to our knowledge, that estimates
consumption insurance parameters under both the full risk-sharing model and a partial
insurance model.
Based on all specifications used in this research, we support estimations from the
partial insurance model as it allows for self-insurance instruments other than savings. We
observe a high, but not complete, level of consumption smoothing among poor
households in small villages in Colombia, with food consumption’s being better insured
than nonfood consumption. In addition, results suggest that FA has been effective as a
risk management instrument protecting food consumption when households are faced by
income shocks and has not displaced risk pooling among households in the same
communities. These findings provide strong indications that households engage in risk

2

A pool of cross-sectional data for the period 1975–1984 from the International Crops Research Institute of
the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT).
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management strategies aimed at insulating, at least partially, consumption changes from
income changes. For instance, our results suggest that the introduction of this program
has enforced risk coping instruments such as the use of savings and assets, and has
displaced internal transfers. If FA has in fact crowded-out or enforced existing informal
risk coping strategies and how the final well being of beneficiary households has been
affected are issues not addressed on this paper. Finally, we conclude that FA, despite not
being a consumption insurance program, helps treated families to smooth consumption.
Results are robust to different specifications.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides an
overview of the program and a description of the evaluation sample used for the
empirical analysis. The subsequent section examines risks faced by households in rural
Colombia and describes the data used for the empirical analysis. Following is a section
that presents basic predictions of the full risk-sharing model and the influential findings
on risk coping behavior and consumption smoothing arrangements in developing
economies. The next section contains the empirical model and results for the full
insurance model. The two subsequent sections present the model used in this paper to
estimate partial insurance parameters based on both Blundell et al.’s (2008) and this
study’s estimations, respectively. The following section presents an analysis of risk
coping strategies used by households to buffer adverse income shocks, and the final
section reports the conclusions and makes suggestions for future research.

6

Familias en Acción
The program Familias en Acción is a welfare program run by the Colombian
government to foster the accumulation of human capital in rural Colombia. It is similar to
other CCT programs, such as Progresa, in Mexico (now called Oportunidades); Red de
Proteccion Social, in Nicaragua; and Bolsa Familia, in Brazil, that have been
implemented in middle-income countries during the last decade in an effort to break the
intergenerational transmission of poverty. The FA program is aimed primarily at
improving the education, health, and nutrition of poor families. The nutrition component
consists of a basic monetary supplement that is given to all beneficiary families with
children under seven years of age. The health component consists of vaccinations and
growth and development checks for children, as well as courses on nutrition, hygiene,
and contraception for their mothers. Participation in the health component is a
precondition for receiving the benefits of the nutritional component. All children between
7 and 18 years old are eligible for the educational component. To receive the grant, they
must attend classes during at least 85% of the school days in each school month as well
as during the whole academic year. The size of the grant increases for secondary
education and is equal for girls and boys. The amount of the subsidy on a monthly basis
at the time of the baseline survey was 14,000 Colombian pesos (COP) or (US$6) for each
child attending primary school and COP$28,000 or (US$12) for each child attending
secondary school in 2005. The nutritional supplement3 is paid to families with children
aged between 0 and 6 years. The amount is COP$46,500 or (US$20) per family per

3

This subsidy is an alternative to participation in a pre-existing program called Hogares Comunitarios.
Beneficiaries cannot participate in both programs with the same children. However, families with children
both under and over the age of 6 can choose to send the young children to a Hogar Comunitario and to
participate in FA with the older children.
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month. The average transfer received per household is COP$61,500, which represents
approximately 25% of average household income of beneficiary households. In general,
all the transfers are received by the female head of the household every two months.
Familias en Acción determined household eligibility in two stages: first by
identifying target communities and then by choosing low-income households within
those communities. Selection criteria for target communities were based on the following
conditions. The town must: (i) have fewer than 100,000 inhabitants and not be a
departmental capital, (ii) have sufficient education and health infrastructures, (iii) have a
bank, and (iv) have a municipality administrative office with relatively up-to-date welfare
lists and other official documents deemed important. A subset of 622 of the 1,060
Colombian municipalities qualified for the program. Eligible households were those
registered at SISBEN4 level 1 at the end of December 1999, with children under 17 years
old, living in the target municipalities. SISBEN 1 households account for roughly the
lowest quintile of Colombia’s household income distribution (Attanasio, 2004).
The program started operating in the latter half of 2002.5 It has benefited
approximately 1,500,000 households since its beginning, and the cost has ascended to the
sum of 300 thousands of millions of Colombian pesos annually (US$150 million). The
cost of the program corresponds to the 0.5% of the Colombian GDP and represents
approximately 10% of educational expenditures in the country.
The Evaluation Sample
For evaluation purposes, it was decided to construct a representative stratified
sample of treatment municipalities and to choose control municipalities among those that
4

SISBEN, Sistema Unificado de Beneficiarios, is a six-level poverty indicator used in Colombia to target
welfare programs and for the pricing of utilities.
5
In a few municipalities the program started as early as the end of 2001.
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were excluded from the program but that belonged within the same strata. The strata were
determined by region and by an index of infrastructure based on health and education.
The control towns were chosen within the same stratum to be as similar as possible to
each of the treatment towns, in terms of population, area, and quality of life index. Most
of the control municipalities were towns with basic school and health infrastructures but
without banks or, in the few cases chosen to match relatively large municipalities, just
over 100,000 inhabitants. As a consequence, control towns are broadly comparable to
treatment towns (Attanasio, 2004). In the end, the evaluation sample was made up of 122
municipalities, 57 of which were treatment and 65 of which were controls.
For each municipality, approximately 100 eligible households were included in
the evaluation sample. The total evaluation sample consists of 11,462 households
interviewed between June and October 2002 (baseline survey), 10,742 households
interviewed between July and November 2003 (first wave), and 9,566 households
interviewed between November 2005 and April 2006 (second wave). The attrition rate
between the three rounds was approximately 16%.6 Most of the observations lost were
households which children´ age exceeded the required age or households that move from
their location and were no possible to find again. Compliance was very high,7 more than
97% of the eligible households participate in the program, so for the analysis we include
in the sample all observations from treatment municipalities.
The final longitudinal data used in this study include information from 6,519
repeated households, after excluding households that received payments before the
6

According to Attanasio (2007) attrition between baseline survey and the second follow up survey is
not statistically different between treatment and control households. Therefore we assume that lost
of observations is random.
7
The main reason for no compliance was lack of the required documents fro registration. None of the
households reported lack of interest of participation in the program.
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baseline survey and households located in control municipalities that received payments
during the second survey. 8 At the household level, the sample consists of families that
are potential beneficiaries of the program—that is, households with children from the
poorest sector of society. Data are collected at both the household and the individual
level. The available data provide a rich set of variables that allows us to measure
consumption of durables and non-durables, family composition, household sociodemographic structure, labor supply, nutritional status of children, education, household
assets, income, and different shocks to income, for both rural and urban households.

Empirical Evidence on Risk and Consumption
Shocks
The variables used to identify the various shocks experienced by households are
obtained from direct questions in the evaluation survey. In each of the three survey
rounds, the household was asked whether during the last year it had experienced any of
the following shocks: crop loss or job loss, death of a household member, illness of any
household member, violent attack or displacement, or weather shock.9 We include an
additional shock, unemployment of the household head, which takes a value of one if the
household head was looking for a job for more than three months during the year
previous to the survey. In that way, we expect to capture a severe income shock.
For the sample of households in treatment and control municipalities, the
prevalence of different types of shocks at the household level during each of the crosssection surveys are reported in Table 1. As we observe, there is no statistical difference
8

A total of 13 municipalities of the control sample were converted to treatment municipalities in
2005, before the second wave of the evaluation survey.
9
Fire, floods, or other catastrophic events.
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between treatment and control households for all of the shocks, except for illness during
the first round. In order to control for potential endogeneity of this shock, we distinguish
between illnesses of children, which can be very endogenous, and illnesses of the
household head and other adults, which should be less endogenous. Participation in the
program could decrease the vulnerability to disease shocks of children, as the program
imposes regular visits to health centers as a condition for receiving part of the transfers
(Attanasio, 2004). We find that illness of the household head is not statistically different
between treatment and control municipalities, suggesting that it is an exogenous shock,
while illness of children and spouse are correlated with program participation and so
might be endogenous. For the purposes of this research we use exclusively illness of
household head as a measure of shock.
Data show that the exposure of households to crop loss and unemployment of
household head is very high: over 10% of households had at least one crop loss and over
5% had at least one member unemployed for more than 3 months during the year
previous to the interview. Around 11% of the households reported having the household
head ill for more than two weeks at least once over the year prior to the survey. Death of
any household member, being a victim of violence, and weather shocks are less frequent
but can be very harmful to poor families because they result not only in loss of income
but also in increased household expenditures.

11

Table 1. Frequency of Idiosyncratic Shocks
Crop loss

Unemployment,
HH head

Death, HH
member

Weather

Violence

Control

11.39%

5.20%

1.81%

1.55%

1.16%

Treatment

9.58%

5.14%

2.01%

0.95%

1.02%

T-test (p value)

0.483

0.777

0.709

0.615

0.808

Control

12.66%

5.47%

1.81%

1.06%

0.95%

Treatment

13.50%

4.93%

2.54%

1.25%

1.48%

T-test (p value)

0.545

0.323

0.085

0.913

0.136

Control

12.25%

5.87%

2.09%

5.95%

1.50%

Treatment

13.67%

5.61%

2.39%

5.57%

1.89%

T-test (p value)

0.563

0.193

0.598

0.469

0.536

Baseline

1st wave

2nd wave

Baseline
Control

9.37%

12.40%

9.56%

8.67%

Treatment

11.65%

13.96%

11.43%

7.95%

T-test (p value)

0.136

0.636

0.582

0.636

Control

10.16%

12.66%

9.05%

7.61%

Treatment

9.97%

11.28%

8.18%

6.51%

T-test (p value)

0.024

0.645

0.067

0.045

Control

9.61%

10.11%

7.32%

3.92%

Treatment

10.00%

10.60%

7.08%

3.33%

T-test (p value)

0.223

0.574

0.293

0.569

1nd wave

2nd wave

otes: T-test of difference in household means computed clustering at the municipality level.

12

In order to capture the covariate nature of weather shocks, we use the proportion
of households within a municipality reporting to have suffered this shock (de Janvry et
al., 2006). Community violence is obtained from other sources and measures the number
of terrorist attacks that municipalities had during the year before the interview.10 Mean
statistics and differences among treatment and control municipalities are presented in
Table 2. As we can observe, there are not pre-treatment and post-treatment statistical
differences in the occurrence of these covariate shocks between treatment and control
municipalities.
Table 2. Frequency of Covariate Shocks

Weather

Violence

Observations

Survey

Treatment

Control

T-test (p value)

Baseline

0.82

0.80

0.9725

1st wave

0.96

1.06

0.8631

2nd wave

1.35

1.74

0.1639

Baseline

0.82

0.87

0.8744

1st wave

0.75

1.25

0.2075

2nd wave

0.89

1.61

0.3476

2804

3715

otes: Numbers indicates the average proportion of households on each municipality that have suffered
weather and violence shocks. T-test of difference in means among communities in the sample.

Consumption
The evaluation survey of FA contains detailed information on food and nonfood
expenditures in all three rounds: baseline, first wave, and second wave. In food
expenditures, there is information on the amount of money spent by households in buying
10

These data have been collected by Interconexion Electrica SA (ISA) since 1998. ISA is the biggest
power line operator in Colombia, which has been the target of recurrent terrorist attacks.
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fruits and vegetables, cereals and grains, meats and animal products, and other food
products, like soft drinks, alcoholic beverages, coffee, tea, etc. In the nonfood
expenditures category, there is information on the money spent on clothing, health
products and services, house maintenance products, school and educational goods,
transportation, utilities, and other nonfood expenditures, like cigarettes, social events, and
toys. Expenditures on durables, such as furniture, and luxury items are excluded from our
expenditure measures as they not represent a regular expenditure of the household.
Depending on the commodity, good, or service, the survey asked the head of
household about the expenditures made during the week, month, semester, or year prior
to the date of the survey. In order to construct the measures of household consumption
used in this paper, we converted all expenditures into a household’s monthly
expenditures and then added them up across the corresponding categories: total
consumption, food consumption, and nonfood consumption. We also deflated the
measures using the National Consumer Price Index of Colombia and turned them into
adult-equivalent11 pesos at constant 2002 prices. In-kind food consumption12 is included in
our measures using town-level prices observed for households buying similar commodities.

Table 3 shows that households spend around COP$8,000 per adult equivalent per
month on total consumption, and that 70% of these expenditures are on food. There are
no pretreatment differences in consumption between treatment and control households.
Attanasio et al. (2005) have shown the effectiveness of the FA program to increase food
consumption in both rural and urban areas. They estimate a 15% increase in average
consumption levels one year after the baseline survey. They also find that shares in food
11

Household members older than 12 years old are counted as 1 person; household members younger
than 12 years are counted as 0.5 person.
12
Commodities consumed but not purchased (i.e. produced or received as pay or as a gift.
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and nonfood consumption are not affected by the program but that it has created
redistributive effects in favor of children through expenditure on children’s clothing and
on education. They also found that the program has not significantly affected
consumption of adult goods, such as alcohol and tobacco or adults’ clothing.
Table 3. Consumption at Baseline
Total

Food

&onfood

Treatment

83067.72

60222.32

22845.4

Control

82711.8

60305.42

22406.38

T-test

0.3678

0.2239

0.1385

otes: Consumption measures are per adult equivalent deflated to 2002 price level in Colombian pesos. Ttest of difference in means computed clustering at the municipality level.

Control Variables
Table 4 provides the means and standard deviations of the main variables used in
the analysis for the sample of households in the treatment and control municipalities for
all three surveys. All of the variables used in all of the regressions are at the household
level. Monthly household income is constructed by adding reported labor income, selfemployment, pensions, interest, rents, and government transfers, including FA potential
transfer.13 Income transfers and remittances received from neighbors, friends, and
relatives are excluded from total income, as these sources of income are likely to reflect
ex-post adjustments to shocks. Income is expressed in adult equivalent measures and
deflated to 2002 prices. Agriculture indicates the household head was occupied in
agricultural activities. Members economically active indicates the number of persons in
13

Potential FA transfer was estimated for all beneficiary households according the number of
beneficiary children in the household.
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the household older than 12 who were working or looking for job at the moment of the
survey. Education variables indicates the last level of education by the head and partner
of the household.14 Urban is a dummy variable that takes a value of one for households
located in urban areas and zero, otherwise. Household composition variables represents
the proportion of household members by age.

14

Education categories are: 1, none; 2, incomplete elementary; 3, complete elementary; 4, incomplete
secondary; 5, complete secondary; 6, college; 7, graduate.
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Table 4. Summary Statistics of Main Variables for all Survey Rounds
Treatment

Control

Variable

Mean

Std. dev.

Mean

Std. dev.

Income

59742

47636

53954

57921

Labor Income

28390

41619

29128

50064

HH head age

45.182

12.540

46.727

12.676

Wife age

39.889

9.959

40.997

10.177

HH head education

2.885

1.430

2.974

1.495

Spouse education

3.083

1.198

3.159

1.290

Female HH heada

0.216

0.412

0.182

0.386

Own housea

0.271

0.444

0.245

0.430

Urbana

0.461

0.499

0.547

0.498

Agriculturea

0.107

0.161

0.096

0.150

&umber of HH members 0–6

0.875

1.003

0.695

0.927

&umber of HH members 7–12

1.391

1.026

1.428

1.005

&umber of HH members 13–17

1.293

0.898

1.238

0.905

&umber of HH members

4.669

1.784

4.789

1.784

Members economically active

1.885

1.187

2.024

1.223

Observations

2804

3715

otes: Averages based on three rounds. Income measures are per adult equivalent deflated to 2002 price
level in Colombian pesos.a Mean values of dummy variables represent percentage of households that meet
each of the conditions of the variables.

Full Risk Sharing and the Permanent Income Hypothesis
The most relevant risk coping strategies theorized in the literature are the full risksharing hypothesis and the permanent income hypothesis (PIH). The full risk-sharing
hypothesis implies that, once aggregate shocks are accounted for, the growth rate of
17

consumption would be independent of any idiosyncratic shock affecting the income
available to the household (Bardhan & Udry, 1999). That is, the only risk that any
household faces is the risk faced by the municipality as a whole. The alternative
mechanism to coping with income shocks is the permanent income hypothesis, which
states that a household with no opportunity for cross-sectional risk pooling, but with
unlimited access to a credit market and separable preferences of consumption and labor,
makes savings or lending decisions so that the effects of shocks are spread out between
current and future consumption (Bardham & Udry, 1999). According to the hypothesis,
individuals tend to smooth consumption when facing transitory income fluctuations. In
practice, these hypotheses are not very relevant to most of the rural households in
developing countries, given the inexistence of complete credit markets.
Although both hypotheses have been repeatedly rejected in studies using microdata, empirical evidence has shown that consumption reacts too little to income shocks to
be consistent with the theory. Townsend (1994) and Ravallion and Chaudhuri (1997) test
the hypothesis in the ICRISAT Indian villages and reject it, although they find a
substantial amount of risk sharing. Deaton (1992) and Grimard (1997) test the hypothesis
of perfect risk sharing within villages and ethnic groups in Côte d’Ivoire and find little
evidence of any risk pooling at the municipality level and somewhat stronger evidence
within ethnic groups. Udry (1994) also rejects the hypothesis for northern Nigerian
villages. Skoufias (2003) examined the extent to which Russian households were able to
protect their consumption from fluctuations in their income using longitudinal data from
1994 to 2000. The study found that consumption was only partially protected from
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idiosyncratic shocks to income; with food consumption’s being better protected than
nonfood consumption expenditures.
Evidence from developed countries has also rejected the hypothesis of full risk
insurance (Mace, 1991; Cochrane, 1991). Cochrane (1991), using data on household food
consumption from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) for the period 1980–
1983, regressed changes in consumption onto different measures of idiosyncratic shocks.
His results rejected the full insurance hypothesis for some but not all of the different
shocks. Similarly, Mace (1991) tested consumption insurance with panel data from the
U.S. Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX). She could not reject the full insurance
hypothesis when evaluating changes in consumption against changes in income, but she
did reject full insurance when using growth rates. Finally, using household panel data
from Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Mali, Mexico, and Russia, Skoufias and Quisumbing (2003)
examined the extent to which households are able through formal and/or informal
arrangements to insure their consumption from specific economic shocks and fluctuations
in their real income. The study showed that adjustments in nonfood consumption
appeared to act as a mechanism for partially insuring ex-post the consumption of food
from the effects of income changes.
These findings raise the question of how households achieve some level of
consumption smoothing given their limited access to financial markets. It seems that poor
households engage in self-insurance strategies and mechanisms to secure their level of
consumption once they face negative shocks. The most common self-insurance
mechanisms for uninsured households are taking loans from the informal financial sector
(Udry, 1994), selling assets (Deaton, 1992; Rosenzweig & Wolpin, 1993), increasing
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household labor supply (Kochar, 1998), or sending children to work in order to
supplement income (Jacoby & Skoufias, 1997). Townsend (1994) showed that even
extremely poor villages in rural India may have self-insurance strategies that allow them
to come close to an optimal allocation of risk bearing. While these actions enable
households to spread the effects of income shocks over time, they might have adverse
consequences in the long run in terms of poverty and future vulnerability of households.15
According to Baez (2006), the work to date on the extent of consumption
smoothing in rural areas allows us to draw three important conclusions. First, most if not
all of the empirical work has mainly rejected the full risk-sharing model. Second, and
regardless of that rejection, a large amount of consumption smoothing is taking place.
Rural households are not purely consuming what they earn, although the poorest have
less scope to do so. And third, considering some market failures that obstruct formal
insurance in rural villages, informal mechanisms seem to play a significant role in
protecting their consumption.
As these conclusions have been widely accepted, recent literature has gone
beyond the complete market model and has proposed and encouraged “the construction
and testing of market models with partial insurance” (cited in Blundell et al., 2008;
Deaton & Paxson, 1992). Also, literature has centered on alternative informal instruments
to bear risk, estimating the extent of consumption insurance over and above selfinsurance, including the role of public interventions. In this paper we address both issues.
First, we investigate how well-known public interventions in developing countries—
15

For example, there is evidence that the use of children as part of the household labor pool compromises
human capital and productivity of those children, raising the risk of poverty for the next generation. Also, if
assets that are used to buffer consumption from income fluctuations are themselves used in the production
process, then there can be important effects on future income from even temporary shocks to current
income.
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CCTs—can play a significant role in reducing consumption vulnerability of poor
households. Second, we estimate the degree of consumption insurance under the full risksharing model and under a partial insurance model recently proposed by Blundell et al.
(2008).
Public interventions can play a significant role in strengthening or displacing the
informal insurance mechanisms already in place. The following examples illustrate some
of the effects of public intervention on consumption insurance. In South Africa, Jensen
(2002) compares the difference in the level of remittances received by pensioned and
non-pensioned workers, after the increase in pension levels, relative to the difference
before the increase. Findings based on the crowding-out effect differ across both groups.
In Mexico, public cash transfer programs have not displaced informal mechanisms within
the scheme of risk-sharing mechanisms (Skoufias, 2003); the evidence, however, is not
clear for Northern Thai villages, where the effects of public intervention vary across
distinct private transfers and informal mechanisms (Townsend, 1995). Finally, in the case
of Mexico, García-Verdú (2002) analyzes a model of informal insurance and also finds
that there is no crowding-out effect between cash transfers and informal safety nets.
To date, no structural model has been estimated to address the issue of partial
insurance directly. Blundell et al. (2008) address the issue of whether partial consumption
insurance is available to agents and estimate the degree of insurance over and above selfinsurance through savings. They do so by contrasting shifts in the distribution of income
growth with shifts in the distribution of consumption growth and then analyze how these
two measures correlate over time. We follow this methodology to estimate the parameters
of partial insurance for transitory and permanent shocks. Section 6 presents the model
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proposed by Blundell et al. (2008), which is used in this paper for the estimation of
partial insurance parameters.

Empirical Evidence of Consumption Insurance under the Full Risk-sharing Model
In this section we consider the model of Pareto efficient risk pooling within a
community to estimate the extent of risk sharing in poor households in Colombia and to
test the effect of FA as an instrument for consumption smoothing. One way of testing the
hypothesis of complete risk sharing within a community is to examine whether the
growth rate of household consumption is independent of the growth rate in household
income after controlling for aggregate shocks. We employ the following specification
commonly encountered in the literature (e.g., Cochrane, 1991; Mace, 1991; Townsend,
1994; Ravallion & Chaudhuri, 1997). 16
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where C refers to adult equivalent consumption per capita of household i in
municipality v at time t; S represents idiosyncratic shocks; FA is a dummy for
households that participate in the program; X  is a set of socioeconomic and
demographic characteristics of the household that takes into account the composition of
the household by age, sex, and education level of household head; and
δ , γ , µ , τ andε represent household, municipality, time, municipality-time fixedeffects, and the idiosyncratic error term, respectively.
Theory predicts that, under complete risk sharing,  = 0, and provides an
estimate of the extent to which idiosyncratic income shocks play a significant role in
16

Similar specifications are defined in terms of consumption and income growth and include a set of binary
variables D identifying each community separately by survey round (round and community interaction
terms) in order to control for covariate shocks.
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explaining the household-specific consumption changes. For the purposes of the
empirical analysis, the insurance group is defined to be the full set of households within a
municipality.17 Since our sample is representative of poor households in small towns in
Colombia, and credit and insurance markets don’t function at all in these towns,18 the
identification of the insurance group is adequate. In addition, we should expect that
insurance arrangements are easier to organize and enforce in small and poor
communities.
To test the effect of FA on consumption smoothing of beneficiary households,
equation (1) include FAht, which is a binary variable equal to 1 for households in
treatment municipalities for the first and second follow-up surveys, and 0 for households
in control municipalities in all three surveys and for treatment municipalities at baseline.
In this equation, the coefficient  is the difference in the vulnerability to risk between
beneficiary and control households in the program that have been hit by the same shock.
A negative estimate of α implies that FA has decreased vulnerability to risk in the
treatment communities. An insignificant estimate of α suggests that there are no
significant differences in the level of consumption insurance between control and
treatment households. The coefficient  reflects the effect of the program on
consumption for households that have been hit by each of the income shocks considered.
Since the program was not randomly assigned among participants and control
households, we can expect program participation being endogenous on the consumption
equation. However, we found balance between the covariates for each sub-sample19 so
we assume that program participation is not correlated with the unobservable
17

On average, there are 50 households in each municipality.
than 5% of the households have credit or a savings account.
19 Each sub-sample corresponds to treatment and control households hit by the same shock.
18 Less
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characteristics on the consumption equation. In addition, using fixed effects regressions
we are able to control for unobservable time invariant characteristics. Alternatively, we
used matching methods to find control households comparable to treatment households.
Results from matching are very similar to results without matching for crop loss and
illness of the household head, and matching was not possible for death and
unemployment shock events. Therefore, we show results from fixed effect regressions.
We consider different definitions of consumption and different types of
idiosyncratic shocks to estimate fixed effects regressions. As dependent variables we use
food consumption, nonfood consumption, and total consumption. The idiosyncratic
shocks considered are: (i) death of a household member, (ii) illness of the household
head, (iii) crop loss or job loss, and (iv) unemployment of household head. The
household surveys asked each household whether it has suffered any of these shocks
during the year prior to the date of the interview. Hence, each household was allowed to
declare whether it was affected by a shock or not.
Fixed effects estimates of equation (1) presented in Table 5 include estimations
for one type of shock at a time, and households hit by one shock, two shocks, and three or
more shocks.20 As discussed above, these estimates are obtained under the assumption
that the insurance group consists of all households in a municipality and include
municipality-year fixed effects. All regressions control for household composition by
age, sex, and the following household characteristics: age and dummies for level of
education of the household head, female household head, number of household members

20

Regression is also estimated using all shocks together. Results are not different from estimations
using one shock at a time indicating there is no correlation among shocks.
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active in the labor market, dummy if the house is owned as a measure of assets, dummy
for households working in agriculture as a proxy of vulnerability to shocks, and
municipality characteristics such as population, number of schools and health centers,
dummy for households located in urban regions as well as in different economics regions
in the country.
Table 5. Impact of Idiosyncratic Shocks on Consumption: fixed effects estimation

Crop loss

*Treatment

Unemployment

*Treatment

Death

*Treatment

Illness, HH head

*Treatment

Food consumption

Nonfood consumption

Total consumption

-0.083***

-0.026

-0.068**

(0.02)

(0.03)

(0.02)

0.060*

0.069

0.056*

(0.02)

(0.06)

(0.02)

-0.155***

-0.285***

-0.236***

(0.02)

(0.04)

(0.04)

0.077

0.005

0.063

(0.07)

(0.10)

(0.07)

0.000

0.226***

0.144**

(0.05)

(0.04)

(0.05)

-0.186*

-0.182**

-0.198**

(0.08)

(0.09)

(0.07)

-0.032

-0.13*

0.028

(0.02)

(0.04)

(0.02)

-0.010

0.089

0.007

(0.03)

(0.06)

(0.04)
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One shock

*Treatment

Two shocks

*Treatment

Three shocks

*Treatment

Food consumption

Nonfood consumption

Total consumption

-0.046**

-0.112***

-0.065***

(0.02)

(0.03)

(0.02)

0.031*

0.061*

0.038*

(0.01)

(0.04)

(0.02)

-0.046**

-0.135***

-0.095***

(0.02)

(0.03)

(0.02)

0.021*

0.028

0.058

(0.01)

(0.04)

(0.09)

-0.040**

-0.149***

-0.105***

(0.02)

(0.03)

(0.02)

0.010*

0.061

0.049

(0.01)

(0.04)

(0. 13)

otes: The measure of consumption is its adult equivalent value in units of 2002 pesos. Estimations are
marginal effects of the control variables of interest, ie. Shock events. Robust standard errors, clustered at
the municipality level, are in parentheses. Additional repressors included but not reported: household age
and education, household composition by age and sex, number of household members active in the labor
market, if the house is owned, if household members work in agriculture, and municipality characteristics
such as population, number of schools and health centers, if urban. Total number of observations is
6519.Municipality-year effects included. Each individual coefficient is statistically significant at the *10%,
**5%, or ***1% level.

Considering shocks one at a time, it is evident that the null hypothesis of perfect
risk sharing is rejected for crop loss, unemployment and illness of the household head.
Crop loss will reduce per capita food consumption by 8% and total consumption by 6%,
while unemployment will reduce food consumption by 15% and nonfood consumption by
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28%.21 Illness of the household head reduces nonfood consumption by 13% and doesn´t
have a significant effect on food consumption. Death of a household member increase
nonfood and total consumption with respect to households that have no shocks, so there
is no evidence of consumption smoothing for this shock. The increase in nonfood
consumption is explained by the fact that these shocks usually increase funeral
expenditures.22
The role of FA as an instrument for consumption insurance is also evaluated.
Being a beneficiary of the FA program would protect the household’s food consumption
when it experiences a crop loss but not unemployment of the household head. That is,
while control households reduce food consumption by 8% when they have a crop loss,
treatment households reduce food consumption by 2%. It is interesting to see that
treatment households are no better insured against unemployment than control
households as the estimated coefficient is not statistically different from zero. Negative
estimations of death shocks for treatment households indicate that, while control
households increase non food consumption after these shocks, treatment households are
better able to buffer them. One explanation is that treatment households might have
available less costly ex-ante self-insurance strategies than control households. For
example, it is possible that the FA cash transfer works also as an income-smoothing
mechanism for treatment households.

21

The high coefficients of job loss could be a consequence of the potential endogeneity of this
variable in the consumption equation. It could be expected that unemployment is correlated with
unobservable characteristics of the household to explain consumption.
22
Nonfood consumption is the sum of health, clothing, and miscellaneous expenditures.
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Finally, we measure the effect of having one shock and having more than one
shock at a time.23 Having a negative shock reduces food consumption by 4% and non
food consumption by 11%, and the program partially protects food and non food
consumption. Having two or more shocks reduces food by 4% and non food consumption
by 14% and the program FA partially protects food consumption but non food
consumption. There are not big differences in consumption changes between having two
or more shocks.
Covariate Shocks
In order to capture the covariate nature of weather and violence shocks, we use
the proportion of households within a municipality reporting to have suffered each shock
as environmental and violence shock variables. Also, we use an alternative measure for
violence: the number of terrorist attacks that municipalities have had during the year
before the interview.
To examine the degree of consumption smoothing of individual households with
respect to covariate risk, we remove the municipality-year fixed effects from the
estimation to calculate the following equation:
 =  +  '
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The model of full risk sharing predicts that local risk-sharing arrangements permit
households to efficiently pool the idiosyncratic variation within communities, but they
can do little to help households deal with covariate risk. .. Therefore, we should expect
 ' = 1, under a Pareto efficient model, or an estimate of 0 <  ' < 1 if households are

23

We use a set of dummy variables that takes the value of one for households that have one shock,
two shocks and three or more shocks during the same year.
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able to smooth at least some part of community shocks by formal or informal insurance
mechanisms.
As before, we consider the following dependent variables: food consumption,
nonfood consumption, and total consumption. The covariate shocks considered are: (i)
violence and (ii) weather shocks. For estimation, we use fixed effects regression with
robust standard errors clustering at a municipality level. All regressions control for the
same exogenous variables included in equation (1).
Results are presented in Table 6. As we observe, violence does not affect
consumption. This is reasonable if we assume that most of the terrorist attacks are
targeted at institutions such as banks, police stations, government offices, or to the army
and not to civilians. Weather shocks seem to have a very small effect on consumption,
decreasing nonfood consumption by 0.91% in control communities and by only 0.71% in
treatment communities. Results are opposite to economic predictions, under which we
should expect a positive and significant effect from covariate shocks on consumption,
with estimations close to one. However, these results can be explained by the fact that
they are not permanent but transitory shocks. In fact, Colombia had no severe long-term
weather shocks during 2002–2005.
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Table 6. Impact of Covariate Shocks on Consumption: fixed effects regression

Violence

*Treatment

Weather shocks

*Treatment

Food consumption

&onfood consumption

Total consumption

-0.023

-0.009

-0.011

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

0.006

0.005

0.001

(0.01)

(0.02)

(0.01)

0.000

-0.009***

-0.004

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

0.005*

0.002*

0.003

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

otes: The measure of consumption is its adult equivalent value in units of 2002 pesos. Estimations are
marginal effects of the control variables of interest, ie. community shock events. Robust standard errors,
clustered at the municipality level, are in parentheses. Additional repressors included but not reported:
household age and education, household composition by age and sex, number of household members active
in the labor market, if the house is owned, if household members work in agriculture, and municipality
characteristics such as population, number of schools and health centers, if urban. Municipality-year effects
included. Total number of observations is 6519.Each individual coefficient is statistically significant at the
*10%, **5%, or ***1% level.

Consumption Smoothing Against Idiosyncratic Income Change
Most of the empirical studies (Skoufias, 2003; Townsend, 1994; Ravallion &
Chaudhuri, 1997) have tested the hypothesis of full risk sharing using changes on
household income as a measure of shocks. Using income growth instead of negative
shocks dummy variables has the advantage that income has the same time frame as
consumption. In the section above, the reference period of consumption (the month
before the survey) can differ from the period of shocks (year prior to the survey).
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We estimate equation (3) using a fixed effects regression and DID matching
regression in order to control for potential endogeneity of program participation on the
consumption equation.24 In this specification we use consumption growth per adult
equivalent in constant values as a dependent variable and income growth per adult
equivalent in constant values as independent variables. Since declared income might be
endogenous in our specifications, we use lagged income as instrumental variables of
income.25 Municipality-time fixed effects are replaced by a set of binary variables D
identifying each community separately by survey round (round and community
interaction terms). Including the community/round interaction dummies have the purpose
of controlling for aggregate shocks insured at the community level.
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Results from this specification will reveal the average degree of consumption
insurance in the community to any change in the household’s income. As before, under
full risk sharing we expect α = 0, but if α is positive and significant, it provides an
estimate of the partial correlation between income and consumption growth in control
municipalities. If FA helps beneficiary households to cope with income shocks, we
should expect a significantly negative estimate of α , and the sum α + α will provide
an estimate of the partial correlation between income and consumption growth in the
treatment municipalities. The measure of consumption insurance adopted under this
specification can be interpreted as a partial insurance parameter, where lower estimated
24

Using DID matching gave us an advantage over the small number of studies that have tried to
identify the impact of cash transfer programs on consumption insurance. As Skoufias (2003)
remarks, “the absence of any reliable consumption data in treatment and control villages before the
implementation of Progresa prevent one from applying the difference-in-differences estimator for
the evaluation of the impact of PROGRESA on consumption insurance” (pp.638).
25
We include income from 1999 to 2001 as instrumental variables of observed income in 2002.
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values of α suggest a high degree of consumption insurance and thus a lower
vulnerability of consumption to income shocks (Amin et al., 2003).
In order to correct any pretreatment differences remaining from the quasiexperimental design used to select the sample of treatment and control municipalities, we
also use a difference in difference matching estimator26 (also called conditional
matching) to estimate the effects of the program in consumption for households with
income shocks. . Matching involves pairing treatment and comparison units that are
similar in terms of their observable characteristics, and a DID estimator compares the
conditional before/after outcomes of participants with those of nonparticipants, allowing
for unobservable but temporally invariant differences in outcomes between participants
and nonparticipants. Thus, the DID matching estimator extends the conventional DID
estimator by defining outcomes conditional on the propensity score and using
nonparametric matching methods to construct the differences. DID matching is superior
to DID as it does not impose linear functional form restrictions in estimating the
conditional expectation of the outcome variable (Smith & Todd, 2005).
For matching, we use non-parametric kernel propensity score matching with

replacement to find the best counterfactual sample, and then estimate the difference in
difference equation. We use the Imben´s variance matrix to estimate the statistically
significance of the estimated ATT. Finally, we restrict the analysis to individuals in the
common support27 in order to minimize any bias due to extrapolation within the
parametric specification and reweight the observations according to the weighting
26 DID

matching was first suggested by Heckman et al. (1998a). It extends the conventional DID
estimator by defining outcomes conditional on the propensity score and using semiparametric
methods to construct the differences.
27
The region over which treated individuals have a counterpart in the group of controls
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function of the matching estimator. We also estimate the bias-corrected matching
estimator proposed by Imbens (2004) which adjusts the difference within the matches for
the differences in their covariate values. Finally, since our treatment households are those
eligible on the program, our estimations represent intent to treat effect of the program on
the treated (ITT). However, we expect this is very close to the average treatment effect of
the program (ATT) as non-compliance was mainly due to lack of required documents of
the households.
Estimations of equation (3) using fixed effects regression are reported in Table 7
and in Table 8 using DiD Matching regression. Results show that, when we measure
shocks as changes in income, matching is required in order to control for potential
differences between treatment and control households on consumption. The estimates
presented in Table 7 column (1) show that a 10% drop in real income is accompanied by
a 1.8% drop in household total consumption, a slightly lower (1.7%) decrease in food
consumption, and a higher (2%) drop in nonfood consumption. However, the
insignificant coefficients of the interaction of income changes with the dummy variable
identifying beneficiary households of FA suggest that there are no significant differences
in the level of consumption insurance between control and treatment households. The
effect of the program is better identified using matching methods. Results in Table 8
show that, controlling for pretreatment differences, FA partially insures food
consumption but not nonfood consumption. Unbiased estimates of the impact of the
program on consumption insurance improve our previous estimates and are robust with
estimations using dummy variables for idiosyncratic shocks.
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The same regression was estimated using percentage change in labor income as an
explanatory variable. We should expect a higher degree of consumption insurance with
respect to changes in labor income than with respect to changes in total income since
labor income is already insured.28 In fact, we observe in Table 7 and Table 8 that
consumption insurance is higher for labor income than for total income. The estimates for
food consumption indicate that a 10% decrease in labor income will reduce total
consumption by 0.9%, with no differences between food and nonfood consumption.
Estimations using matching methods are very similar to estimations using fixed effect
regression.

Table 7. Fixed Effects Regression: Impact of Household Income Changes in Household
Consumption

∆(Ln total income)

*Treatment

∆(Ln labor income)

*Treatment

Food consumption

&onfood consumption

Total consumption

b/se

b/se

b/se

0.172***

0.201***

0.188***

(0.02)

(0.02)

(0.01)

-0.016

-0.042

-0.027

(0.02)

(0.03)

(0.02)

0.097***

0.090***

0.095***

(0.01)

(0.02)

(0.01)

-0.016

0.019

0.000

(0.02)

(0.02)

(0.02)

otes: The measure of consumption is its adult equivalent value in units of 2002 pesos. Estimations are the
marginal effects of being a FA beneficiary and having an income shock. Robust standard errors, clustered

28

Labor contracts are income-smoothing mechanisms that might reduce risk and the effects of
negative income shocks.
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at the municipality level, are in parentheses. Additional repressors included but not reported: household age
and education, household composition by age and sex, number of household members active in the labor
market, if the house is owned, if household members work in agriculture, and municipality characteristics
such as population, number of schools and health centers, if urban. Municipality-year effects included.
Total number of observations is 6519.Each individual coefficient is statistically significant at the *10%,
**5%, or ***1% level

Table 8. DID Matching Estimations: Impact of Household Income Changes in Household
Consumption Controlling for Pretreatment Effects

∆(Ln total income)

*Treatment

∆(Average Ln labor
income)

*Treatment

Food consumption

&onfood consumption

Total consumption

b/se

b/se

b/se

0.237***

0.257***

0.234***

(0.02)

(0.02)

(0.01)

-0.139***

-0.008

-0.154

(0.03)

(0.03)

(0.05)

0.094***

0.093***

0.095***

(0.01)

(0.02)

(0.01)

-0.031

-0.021

0.000

(0.02)

(0.02)

(0.02)

otes: The measure of consumption is its adult equivalent value in units of 2002 pesos. Estimations are the
ATT on consumption of being a FA beneficiary controlling for household income shocks. Robust standard
errors, clustered at the municipality level, are in parentheses. Additional repressors included but not
reported: household age and education, household composition by age and sex, number of household
members active in the labor market, if the house is owned, if household members work in agriculture, and
municipality characteristics such as population, number of schools and health centers, if urban.
Municipality-year effects included. Total number of observations is 6519.Each individual coefficient is
statistically significant at the *10%, **5%, or ***1% level.
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Risk Pooling at the Community Level
Finally, we investigate whether risk sharing is in fact taking place among
households within the same insurance community by eliminating the municipality-year
fixed effects from equation (3) and including the average income growth of each
municipality as a right hand side variable, as suggested by Deaton (1997) and Ravallion
and Chaudhuri (1997).
....
∆ =  +  ∆*
 + 

....
∗ ∆*
 +  +  (4)

Under this model, the growth rate in household consumption is determined by the
growth rate in household income as well as the growth rate in average community
income. According to the hypothesis of full risk sharing,  = 1, so individual
consumption is not protected from aggregate income shocks. Under imperfect risk
sharing, evidence that the growth rate in average community income has a significant role
in the growth rate of household consumption is consistent with the hypothesis that some
risk sharing is taking place within the communities. We test also if the degree of
insurance provided by the community is affected by the presence of the FA program. A
positive coefficient would be interpreted as the program’s increasing risk pooling in the
community; the opposite would be concluded for a negative coefficient. For estimation
we control for household income changes and for other household and municipality
characteristics.
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Table 9. Impact of Average Community Income Changes in Household Consumption
Food consumption
Fixed effects regression
∆(Average Ln income, municipality)

*Treatment

&onfood consumption

b/se

b/se

0.630*

0.386

(0.27)

(0.59)

-0.608

-0.929

(0.69)

(1.12)

0.560**

0.386

(0.27)

(0.59)

0.039

-0.008

(0.03)

(0.03)

ATT: DiD matching estimates
∆(Average Ln income, municipality)

*Treatment

otes: The measure of consumption and income is its adult equivalent value in units of 2002 pesos. Robust
standard errors, clustered at the municipality level, are in parentheses. Additional repressors included but
not reported: household age and education, household composition by age and sex, number of household
members active in the labor market, if the house is owned, if household members work in agriculture, and
municipality characteristics such as population, number of schools and health centers, if urban.
Municipality-year effects included. Total number of observations is 6519.Each individual coefficient is
statistically significant at the *10%, **5%, or ***1% level

The estimated coefficients of the growth rate in average community income, the
parameters γ and γ , are reported in Table 9. The estimates provide evidence in favor of
community risk sharing in food consumption but not in nonfood consumption. Also, no
significant differences are found regarding the effect of mean community growth rate
between treatment and control households. As changes in average community income
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reflect covariate income shocks, results show that households are less insured to covariate
income shocks than to idiosyncratic income shocks, 37% and 80%, respectively.
Nonetheless, these results are opposed to our findings above when using measures
of weather and violence shocks. As we said before, it is possible that our measures of
community shocks are not the best or that they reflect community transitory shocks
instead of permanent shocks. In order to check our results, we estimate the partial
insurance model proposed by Blundell et al. (2006) and calculate the partial insurance
parameters for permanent and transitory shocks using the same data. Results are very
similar to our estimations above. Details of the methodology and results are presented in
the next section.

Partial Insurance Model
Based on Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2008), we estimate the degree of
partial insurance for transitory and permanent shocks for different households’
characteristics: (i) household head education level, (ii) urban and rural households, (iii)
single parent and biparental households, and (iv) FA beneficiary and control households.
In this model, partial insurance is defined as smoothing mechanisms—other than personal
savings and borrowings—to smooth consumption changes when incomes are shifted by
permanent or transitory shocks. These mechanisms could help us understand the lower
volatility of consumption in relation to the volatility of income and introduce a method to
measure the impact of different-smoothing tools (Casado, 2009). This model has less
assumptions and it is more complete than the full insurance model in the sense that it
examines the roles of asymmetric information, moral hazard, and heterogeneity and
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shows how the complete markets model must be amended to include some forms of
imperfect insurance.
This analysis of partial insurance requires the study of income and consumption
process and its relationship to transitory and permanent income shocks. In this model, the
relationship between income shocks and consumption depends on the degree of
persistence of income, and we expect to uncover less insurance for more persistent
shocks. Blundell and Preston (1998) derive the conditions under which the growth of
variance and covariance of income and consumption can be used to separately identify
the growth in variance of permanent and transitory income shocks. Blundell, Pistaferri,
and Preston (2008) describe the transmission of income inequality into consumption
inequality and derive the transitory and permanent partial insurance parameters.
It is supposed that income has the following equation:
4
log *, = 3,
5 + 6, + 7,

where Y is real income and Z a set of control variables (such as education of the
household head and number of household members, among others). 6, is the permanent
income component, and 7, stands for transitory income.
Assuming a random walk for 6, (6, = 6,8 + 9, ) and a martingale process
MA(q) for 7, (7, = ∑<;= :; ,8; ), the difference of the unpredicted income can be
written as:
∆>, = 9, + Δ7,

4
∆ >, = ∆@A*, − ∆3,
5

where

The Euler equation with CRRA preferences and complete credit markets is:
C8

,8 =

1 + D8 ∆F I JH
C8
E G,H K8 ,
1+
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Computing the mapping from the income shocks ζ, and ε, to the optimal
consumption growth following estimations by Blundell et al. (2008), and assuming that
personal saving is the only mechanism available to smooth consumption, we obtain the
consumption growth equation:
ΔN, = O, 9, + P, , + Q,
where ϕ is the loading factor of permanent shocks and ψ of transitory shocks and where ξ
represents innovations in consumption independent of those from income. The moments
required to compute the partial insurance parameters were estimated using diagonally
weighted minimum distance (DWMD).
Following Meghir and Pistaferri (2004, cited in Blundell et al., 2008) we identify
the parameters of interest ψ and ϕ for transitory and permanent shocks in income.
Following this approach, ψ and ϕ can be understood as the instrumental variable
estimation of ∆c on ∆y using (∆y8 + ∆y + ∆yW ) and E(∆c ∆yW ) as instruments,
respectively.
ψ=

E(∆c ∆yW )
E(∆y ∆yW )

and ϕ =

E(∆c (∆y8 + ∆y + ∆yW )
E(∆y (∆y8 + ∆y + ∆yW )

Where transitory insurance parameter ψ is computed measuring the relation between
income and lagged consumption, it must be correlated through the transitory component
E(∆c ∆yW ) = σZ . Similarly, we compute the covariance between current consumption
and current income growth E(∆c ∆y ), removing the contribution of the transitory
component to compute the permanent income shock effect E(∆c (∆y8 + ∆y +
∆yW ) = σ[ . Finally, the variance of the component σ\ is computed like the variance of
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consumption growth, removing the contribution of permanent and transitory income
shocks.
In order to instrument our income variable, we use retrospective data on income
captured in the baseline survey for the years 1999, 2000, and 2001. We also infer income
for 2004 from an income equation controlling for household and individual
characteristics.
In the above representation, the case of full insurance would be ϕ = ψ = 0,
where neither transitory nor permanent shocks in income would affect consumption. The
case of no insurance would be ϕ = ψ = 1. Parameter estimations between zero and one
identify the degree of transmission of income shocks into consumption. If coefficients are
closer to zero, the degree of insurance will be higher. These partial insurance parameters
include self-insurance (precautionary saving) and other insurance devices, but we cannot
identify each insurance component by itself.

Empirical Evidence of Consumption Insurance under a Partial Insurance Model
In this section we present estimations of the partial insurance parameters for
transitory and permanent income shocks. Using panel data on income and consumption,
we are able to estimate the degree of partial insurance for transitory and permanent
shocks for FA beneficiary and not beneficiary households.
The FA dataset doesn’t show evidence of a MA(q) process for transitory shocks,
so we assume they are uncorrelated (7, = , ). Diagonally weighted minimum distance
(DWMD) was used to estimate parameters because it allows for heteroskedasticity,
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unlike equally weighted minimum distance (EWMD). Also, we assume that insurance
parameters are constant over time.
Table 10. Partial Insurance Parameters
Food consumption

&onfood consumption

Permanent

Transitory

Permanent

Transitory

shocks (Φ)

shocks (Ψ)

shocks (Φ)

shocks (Ψ)

0.42

0.18

0.50

0.17

Control group

0.44

0.14

0.51

0.17

Treatment group

0.37

0.16

0.51

0.16

Groups

Criteria

Complete sample
Program FA

otes: The measure of consumption and income is its adult equivalent value, in units of 2002 pesos.

Estimations of transitory and permanent partial insurance parameters are
presented in Table 10. For the full sample, a 10% permanent income shock induces a
4.2% permanent change in food consumption and a 5% change in nonfood consumption.
Simultaneously, a 10% transitory income shock induces significant 1.8% transitory and
permanent changes in consumption. We find higher degrees of insurance to transitory
shocks than to permanent shocks. Food consumption seems to insure better from
permanent shocks than nonfood consumption. The insurance coefficient of the transitory
shocks is not statistically different between food and nonfood consumption, which
indicates that total consumption is not fully insured against transitory shocks but that the
degree of insurance is high.
The insurance against permanent shocks for the treatment group is higher than for
the control group for food consumption but not for nonfood consumption. That is, as in
our previous results, we observe that the program protects food consumption but not
nonfood consumption of beneficiary households. The insurance capacity to permanent
42

shocks of FA households is almost 74%, while the insurance capacity of control
household is 58%.In conclusion, we observe that the partial insurance parameters for
permanent and transitory shocks are very similar to the estimations of equation (3) using
matching methods. Although both estimations are not directly comparable as the
assumptions and methodology are different, we find similar results about the degree of
consumption insurance of poor households in Colombia and the role of FA to protect
consumption during income shocks.

Risk Coping Strategies and the Role of FA
Results have shown that households in rural Colombia are able to partially spread
the effects of income shocks over time and that this is partially due to risk-sharing
arrangements across households at the community level at any one point in time.
However, we also observed that covariance between nonfood consumption and income is
still pretty low and that risk pooling has been effective in smoothing only food
consumption but not other consumption. Therefore, households may be adopting a
variety of self-insurance strategies to spread the effects of income shocks over time. For
example, they may use their savings (Paxson, 1992); take out loans from the informal
financial sector (Udry, 1994); sell assets (Deaton, 1992; Rosenzweig & Wolpin, 1993);
adjust their labor supply (Kochar, 1998) including sending their children to work instead
of school in order to supplement income (Jacoby & Skoufias, 1997); or rely on transfers
and remittances from friends and neighbors (Rosenzweig, 1988; Besley, 1995; Morduch,
1999).

43

In this section we examine whether the incidence of different shocks is associated
with increased likelihood of using the following coping instruments: (i) increasing
expenditures, (ii) using savings, (iii) incurring debts, (iv) receiving transfers from friends
or relatives (v), selling assets, or (vi) increasing the labor supply of household members.
Households were asked at baseline and in the first survey how they responded to these
shocks. Households could select more than one instrument.
Although answers to these questions could differ from their behavioral responses,
they give a glimpse of how households cope with income shocks and how FA alters these
responses. We estimate the following probit model separately for each of the six coping
instruments mentioned above:
6D]^(* = 1) =  + 



+

( + 

 )

+ ∅

(5)

where Y equals one when the household declares it used each specific instrument to cope
with shocks and where S is a vector of dummy variables denoting the incidence of any of
the following shocks: (i) death of a household member, (ii) illness of a household
member, (iii) crop loss, (iv) natural disaster, or (v) violence. X is a vector of household
and municipality characteristics, such as the age and sex of household head and spouse,
whether the household is headed by a female, the education level of the household head
and spouse, binary variables for owning the house where they live, if the household
works on cropping or harvesting, and age composition of the household. Municipality
variables include a dummy variable for household beneficiaries of FA, for the regions of
the country, for urban areas, and for the survey round. Finally, the coefficients of interest
are β and β1, where β denotes whether the incidence of a shock increases the likelihood
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that the dependent variable Y equals 1 and the extent to which the incidence of the same
shock entails a stronger or opposing reaction in the households benefited by FA (β + β1).
Table 11 presents the marginal effects of the different shock variables on the
probability of adopting a specific response. Results show that, controlling for household
characteristics and for any income shocks, beneficiary households seem to rely more on
savings and less on transfers to smooth consumption. Crop loss is handled by reducing
expenditures and receiving transfers from friends and relatives. However, it is notable
that treatment households seem to reduce the likelihood of using transfers from friends
and relatives as a risk coping instrument when they are hit by these shocks and increase
the likelihood of using assets as a risk coping instrument.
Weather and death shocks are more likely to result in a household’s receiving
help from relatives, while illness shocks force households to incur new loans, probably in
the informal sector at very high interest rates. However, the program has no differential
effect on these self-insurance arrangements.
Results from this section suggest that the FA program might be crowding out
some self-insurance instruments such as internal transfers, while reinforcing the use of
savings. Attanasio and Rios-Rull (1999) have shown that, in a model of risk sharing
under limited commitment, the introduction of a government insurance scheme can
crowd out preexisting informal risk-sharing arrangements, resulting in a decrease in
welfare for the beneficiaries. Therefore, further research should explore how different
coping instruments have in fact been displaced or reinforced by FA.
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Table 11. Probability of using the following Risk Coping Strategies for Idiosyncratic
Income Shocks and the crowding-out effect of FA

Treatment

Death

*trtmt

Illness

*trtmt

Crop loss

*trtmt

Weather

*trtmt

Violence

*trtmt

&

Reduce
expenditures
b/se

Use savings

Sell assets

Credit

b/se

Internal
transfers
b/se

b/se

Increase
labor supply
b/se

b/se

-0.194

0.131*

-0.055

-0.250**

-0.030

-0.010

(0.11)

(0.04)

(0.09)

(0.09)

(0.09)

(0.09)

-0.150

0.235*

0.107

0.231*

0.026

-0.328*

(0.12)

(0.10)

(0.11)

(0.11)

(0.13)

(0.15)

0.000

-0.043

-0.192

0.166

0.115

0.348

(0.17)

(0.17)

(0.16)

(0.16)

(0.20)

(0.21)

-0.043

0.138

-0.012

0.128

0.304***

-0.126

(0.09)

(0.09)

(0.07)

(0.07)

(0.05)

(0.09)

0.043

0.005

-0.059

0.150

0.004

0.083

(0.12)

(0.12)

(0.10)

(0.09)

(0.08)

(0.11)

0.429***

-0.060

-0.138*

0.265***

0.009

0.100

(0.08)

(0.06)

(0.06)

(0.06)

(0.05)

(0.07)

-0.018

0.084

0.144*

-0.189*

0.045

0.091

(0.13)

(0.09)

(0.05)

(0.09)

(0.09)

(0.10)

-0.055

0.046

-0.085

0.365*

-0.124

0.125

(0.18)

(0.14)

(0.13)

(0.18)

(0.17)

(0.16)

-0.051

-0.709*

0.105

-0.133

-0.325

-0.239

(0.23)

(0.30)

(0.19)

(0.23)

(0.22)

(0.23)

-0.252*

-0.142

0.120

-0.056

-0.422*

-0.011

(0.12)

(0.17)

(0.15)

(0.12)

(0.17)

(0.14)

0.278

0.282

-0.113

0.048

0.110

-0.048

(0.17)

(0.22)

(0.27)

(0.19)

(0.22)

(0.17)

5528

5522

5518

5516

5525

5519
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otes: Marginal effects of using self-insurance instruments when households have income shocks. Each
column represents a separate regression. Robust standard errors, clustered at the municipality level, are in
parentheses. Additional repressors included but not reported. Each individual coefficient is statistically
significant at the *10%, **5%, or ***1% level.

Although the results reveal that the program affects the role of transfers as a risk
coping instrument for treatment households, we don´t observe statistical differences
between treatment and control samples on transfers to and from households, in kind, or in
cash, over the three rounds of the survey. Average transfers before and after the program
is presented in Table 12. As stated above, evidence here is not validated with household
behavior. Further research should address the crowding out effect of FA on self-insurance
instruments since the evidence provided here is not sufficient.
Table 12. Transfers in Money Received by Households
Treatment

Control

T-test (p-value)

Baseline

347957.3

341160

0.1157

1st wave

368110.4

355374.4

0.4467

2nd wave

361998.8

355946.9

0.8422

otes: The measures of transfers are per household in units of 2002 pesos. T-test of difference in means
computed clustering at the municipality level.

Conclusion
Under our several specifications above, we reject the hypothesis of complete
consumption insurance, although we observe a high level of consumption smoothing
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among poor households in small villages in Colombia. Results show that (i) the growth
rate of consumption is related to the growth rate of income, but certainly less so than
what one would expect under the alternative hypothesis of a complete lack of risk-sharing
tools, suggesting that insurance is incomplete even for idiosyncratic shocks; (ii) food
consumption is better insured than nonfood consumption; (iii) risk-pooling mechanisms
at the community level insure food consumption but not nonfood consumption;; and (iv)
household consumption growth is much more respondent to changes in aggregate
municipality consumption than to changes in household income. Overall results are
robust to different specifications.
This study has also analyzed the impact of a CCT program on the ability of
households to smooth consumption when faced with negative shocks. Results suggest
that a CCT programs, specifically FA, is effective as a risk-management instrument.
Overall, beneficiary households of FA appear to have lower absolute changes in
consumption than control households when subject to idiosyncratic shocks, and there is
no effect of the program on risk pooling within communities. Results show that
beneficiary households of the program are able to protect food consumption from shocks
such as crop loss and also to safeguard nonfood consumption when faced with the death
of a household member. The program has not been effective in insuring unemployment
and illness shocks. In sum, Familias en Acción, despite not being a consumption
insurance program, helps treated families to smooth consumption, working as a social
insurance program. .
Widely known theories of risk coping strategies in the literature, like the Pareto
full risk sharing hypothesis and the permanent income hypothesis, are clearly rejected by
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the data, giving support to partial insurance models. Estimation of the partial insurance
parameters for transitory and permanent shocks reinforces some of our findings under the
complete markets assumption. On average, households are able to self-insure
consumption against transitory shocks by approximately 83% and against permanent
shocks by about 45%. FA works as insurance for permanent shocks for food consumption
but not for nonfood consumption. Insurance parameters under the partial insurance model
show a higher degree of insurance than under the full risk sharing model as it allows for
self-insurance other than own savings.
Results raise questions about the precise mechanism by which poor households in
Colombia cope with risk. That is, households do not rely exclusively on risk-sharing
arrangements; instead, they appear to complement informal risk-sharing strategies with
self-insurance strategies. Thus, the next step in this research project is to test how costly
self-insurance strategies have been displaced by the program. More precisely, we will
investigate whether the conditional aspect of the program prevents parents from using
their children as risk coping instruments in response to shocks.
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Chapter 2 . THE EFFECTS OF INCOME SHOCKS ON CHILD LABOR AS AN
INSURANCE MECHANISM FOR SCHOOLING

Introduction
This work relates to important literature on consumption smoothing, credit
constraints, and the role of public interventions on a country’s safety net. Poor people in
developing countries are highly exposed to idiosyncratic shocks that cause loss of income
or unexpected expenditures of the household. However, it has been extensively
documented (Morduch, 1994, and others) that poor households succeed in smoothing
their consumption profiles, even with limited access to credit; hence they are likely to
resort to mechanisms other than borrowing to cope with income shocks. This paper
examines one such mechanism, child labor. If households use child labor to cope with
shocks, the costs of uninsured shocks can be quite high in terms of human capital
accumulation and poverty. Therefore, public interventions that alleviate the need for
households to use their children as risk-coping instruments might play an important role
on the safety net of the uninsured (de Janvry, Finan, Sadoulet, & Vakis, 2006).
Conditional cash transfer programs (CCTs) have been proven to be effective in
increasing educational achievements and reducing child labor (Attanasio, Fitzsimons,
Gomez, Lopez, Meghir, & Santiago, 2006; Schultz, 2004). A growing body of evidence
has also shown that CCTs can play an important safety net role, protecting household
consumption during an income shock and helping to mitigate the negative effects of a
shock on children’s human capital investments (de Janvry, Finan, Sadoulet, & Vakis
2006; Maluccio 2005 and others). In a previous chapter of this dissertation, we found that
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consumption smoothing of poor households in Colombia is relatively high,29 and that
households are adopting a variety of self-insurance strategies to spread the effects of
income shocks over time. We also found that the CCT program Familias en Accion (FA)
might be crowding out some self-insurance instruments, such as internal transfers, while
reinforcing the use of savings. Using declared households’ responses, we found no
evidence of increasing household labor supply to buffer income shocks. In this paper, we
go further, testing whether child labor is used as a risk-coping instrument and whether FA
can crowd out this specific behavior, resulting in increased welfare of those involved.
Particularly, this paper investigates the effects of adverse shocks on household
decisions concerning school attendance and child labor in rural Colombia and whether
FA protects children’s school enrollment of households under risk. Based on theoretical
foundations (Jacoby & Skoufias, 1997), we expect that households would underinvest in
the human capital of their children under imperfect credit markets and exposure to
shocks. Also, we might expect CCT programs to protect child human capital from being
used as a risk-coping instrument. If the effect of the condition on school attendance,
acting as a price effect, is much larger than the income effect of the shock, then CCTs can
be an efficient way of providing risk coping while protecting children’s education.
Therefore, the effect of shocks, access to credit, and CCTs on child labor and schooling
decisions is ambiguous. This is what we address in this paper.
The empirical models in this study estimate equations for children’s time at
school and at work and for participation in school full time, work full time, and combined
school and work. For this we use the FA evaluation survey, which includes longitudinal

29

We found that poor households are able to insure at least 80% of food consumption when they face
adverse income shocks.
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detailed data on children’s time use and adverse shocks along with individual, household,
and community characteristics for beneficiary and control households of the program.
Because FA was not randomly assigned among communities,30 we use difference-indifference (DiD) matching methods to control for endogeneity on program participation
and unobservable time invariant effects.
In this paper new ground is explored by explicitly incorporating the interactive
effects of shocks, credit access, and CCT treatment on school and child labor hours.
Previous studies have limited their analysis to estimate the effect of shocks and the
mitigating effect of CCT only on schooling or child labor (de Janvry et al. 2006;
Maluccio 2005 and others), not considering that children can work and study
simultaneously. Given the condition on school attendance together with the fact that time
at school and at work are not perfect substitutes, more relevant effects should be found on
children that perform both activities. Knowing how hours on each activity are affected by
shocks and how the program mitigates these effects is very important to understand the
overall well-being of children.
The results of this research suggest that (i) poor rural households use child labor
to cope with income shocks, but at the expense of leisure or studying time of children, not
at the expense of school enrollment; (ii) shocks have heterogeneous effects on children
by age and sex; (iii) the relationship between economic shocks and school enrollment is
ambiguous, as different types of shocks are likely the product of heterogeneous impacts;
(iv) credit-constrained households have a higher probability of using child labor as a risk-

30

In fact the program was controlled randomly assigned. That is, control municipalities were selected
to be as similar as possible to the randomly selected treatment municipalities.
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coping instrument; and (v) the effect of shocks should be estimated at intensive and
extensive margins to account for complementarities of schooling and working activities.
With respect to the safety net value of FA, we find that the program consistently
reduces the number of hours of child labor and increases the number of study hours, but
not school attendance, for households under shocks. Alternatively, we found that the
program provides strong incentives for children to combine work and school when
households are exposed to shocks. The results of this paper reveal that CCT programs can
work as insurance for the schooling of the poor but are not able to completely displace
costly risk-coping strategies. However, the final well-being of children is still in question.
The remainder of this paper is as follows. The next section provides an overview
of the program and a description of the evaluation sample used for the empirical analysis.
Section 3 reviews previous studies on the effects of CCT programs and income shocks on
school enrollment and child labor and describes a theoretical model that predicts the
impacts of shocks on school and child labor. Section 4 describes the data used in this
study and provides empirical evidence on child labor, the occurrence of shocks, and
control variables including the access to credit among poor households in Colombia.
Section 5 gives the methodology and econometric models for school attendance and work
decisions in the presence of shocks. Results are presented in section 6, and section 7
concludes.
Familias en Acción
The program Familias en Acción is a welfare program run by the Colombian
government to foster the accumulation of human capital in rural Colombia. It is similar to
other CCT programs, such as Progresa, in Mexico (now called Oportunidades); Red de
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Proteccion Social, in Nicaragua; and Bolsa Familia, in Brazil, that have been
implemented in middle-income countries during the last decade in an effort to break the
intergenerational transmission of poverty. The FA program is aimed primarily at
improving the education, health, and nutrition of poor families. The nutrition component
consists of a basic monetary supplement that is given to all beneficiary families with
children under seven years of age. The health component consists of vaccinations and
growth and development checks for children, as well as courses on nutrition, hygiene,
and contraception for their mothers. Participation in the health component is a
precondition for receiving the benefits of the nutritional component. All children between
7 and 18 years old are eligible for the educational component. To receive the grant, they
must attend classes during at least 85% of the school days in each school month as well
as during the whole academic year. The size of the grant increases for secondary
education and is equal for girls and boys. The amount of the subsidy on a monthly basis
at the time of the baseline survey was 14,000 Colombian pesos (COP) or (US$6) for each
child attending primary school and COP$28,000 or (US$12) for each child attending
secondary school in 2005. The nutritional supplement31 is paid to families with children
aged between 0 and 6 years. The amount is COP$46,500 or (US$20) per family per
month. The average transfer received per household is COP$61,500, which represents
approximately 25% of average household income of beneficiary households. In general,
all the transfers are received by the female head of the household every two months.

31

This subsidy is an alternative to participation in a pre-existing program called Hogares Comunitarios.
Beneficiaries cannot participate in both programs with the same children. However, families with children
both under and over the age of 6 can choose to send the young children to a Hogar Comunitario and to
participate in FA with the older children.
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Familias en Acción determined household eligibility in two stages: first by
identifying target communities and then by choosing low-income households within
those communities. Selection criteria for target communities were based on the following
conditions. The town must: (i) have fewer than 100,000 inhabitants and not be a
departmental capital, (ii) have sufficient education and health infrastructures, (iii) have a
bank, and (iv) have a municipality administrative office with relatively up-to-date welfare
lists and other official documents deemed important. A subset of 622 of the 1,060
Colombian municipalities qualified for the program. Eligible households were those
registered at SISBEN32 level 1 at the end of December 1999, with children under 17 years
old, living in the target municipalities. SISBEN 1 households account for roughly the
lowest quintile of Colombia’s household income distribution (Attanasio, 2004).
The program started operating in the latter half of 2002.33 It has benefited
approximately 1,500,000 households since its beginning, and the cost has ascended to the
sum of 300 thousands of millions of Colombian pesos annually (US$150 million). The
cost of the program corresponds to the 0.5% of the Colombian GDP and represents
approximately 10% of educational expenditures in the country.
The Evaluation Sample
For evaluation purposes, it was decided to construct a representative stratified
sample of treatment municipalities and to choose control municipalities among those that
were excluded from the program but that belonged within the same strata. The strata were
determined by region and by an index of infrastructure based on health and education.
The control towns were chosen within the same stratum to be as similar as possible to
32

SISBEN, Sistema Unificado de Beneficiarios, is a six-level poverty indicator used in Colombia to target
welfare programs and for the pricing of utilities.
33
In a few municipalities the program started as early as the end of 2001.
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each of the treatment towns, in terms of population, area, and quality of life index. Most
of the control municipalities were towns with basic school and health infrastructures but
without banks or, in the few cases chosen to match relatively large municipalities, just
over 100,000 inhabitants. As a consequence, control towns are broadly comparable to
treatment towns (Attanasio, 2004). In the end, the evaluation sample was made up of 122
municipalities, 57 of which were treatment and 65 of which were controls.
For each municipality, approximately 100 eligible households were included in
the evaluation sample. The total evaluation sample consists of 11,462 households
interviewed between June and October 2002 (baseline survey), 10,742 households
interviewed between July and November 2003 (first wave), and 9,566 households
interviewed between November 2005 and April 2006 (second wave). The attrition rate
between the three rounds was approximately 16%.34 Most of the observations lost were
households which children´ age exceeded the required age or households that move from
their location and were no possible to find again. The final longitudinal data used in this
study include information from 6,519 repeated households, after excluding households
that received payments before the baseline survey and households located in control
municipalities that received payments during the second survey.35 As compliance was
very high,36 more than 97%, we include in the sample all observations from treatment
municipalities.

34

According to Attanasio (2007) attrition between baseline survey and the second follow up survey
is not statistically different between treatment and control households. Therefore we assume that
lost of observations is random.
35
A total of 13 municipalities of the control sample were converted to treatment municipalities in
2005, before the second wave of the evaluation survey.
36
Reasons for no compliance were due mainly to lack of the required documents and not to lack of
interest of participation in the program.
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At the household level, the sample consists of families that are potential
beneficiaries of the program—that is, households with children from the poorest sector of
society. Data are collected at both the household and the individual level. The available
data provide a rich set of variables that allows us to measure consumption of durables and
non-durables, family composition, household socio-demographic structure, labor supply,
nutritional status of children, education, household assets, income, and different shocks to
income, for both rural and urban households.

Literature Review and Conceptual Framework
A number of studies have measured the impact of uninsured shocks on school
attendance and child labor outcomes, suggesting that parents may be forced to draw on
their children as labor when other strategies are not available (Beegle, Dehejia, & Gatti,
2006; Duryea, Lam, & Levison, 2003; Guarcello, Mealli, & Rosati, 2003; Jacoby &
Skoufias, 1997). Duryea et al. (2003), using data from Brazil, showed that unemployment
shocks significantly increase the probability that a child enters the labor force and
decreases the probability that the child advances in school. Guarcello et al. (2003)
observed a similar response for households in Guatemala. They showed that a negative
shock substantially increases the probability that a child works, or works and studies
simultaneously, and that access to credit and medical insurance provides risk-coping
instruments that help protect children from dropping out of school. Jacoby and Skoufias
(1997) developed a model of human capital accumulation under uncertainty with
complete and incomplete markets. Using data from International Crops Research Institute
for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT) set on a panel of Indian rural households, they
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examined whether fluctuations in family income affect school attendance in the face of
financial market incompleteness. They found that child school attendance does decline
when poor households are hit by a shock and that school attendance is more responsive to
aggregate than idiosyncratic shocks. Finally, Beegle et al. (2006), using data from a
household panel survey in Tanzania, investigated the extent to which transitory income
shocks lead to increases in child labor and found that household asset holdings mitigate
the effects of these shocks.
During the last decade, many have analyzed the role of CCT programs on
children’s school enrollment and work decisions. Schultz (2004) showed that the
Progresa program in Mexico has a positive effect on schooling and helps to reduce child
work, particularly for boys, while girls are able to combine school and domestic work.
An analysis of the program Bolsa Escola in Brazil found that it has a big impact on
increasing school enrollment but it has no influence on child labor (Bourguignon,
Ferreira, & Leite, 2003; Cardoso and Souza, 2004). In most cases, there is evidence that
the effect of a CCT is much stronger on increasing school enrollment than reducing child
labor. However, these studies ignore intensity of work activity, which is clearly very
important from a welfare perspective.
Attanasio et al. (2006) provided estimates of the effect of the FA conditional
transfer on education and work choices, at both extensive and intensive margins. At the
extensive margin they found that FA has a positive effect on school enrollment,
especially in older children, a negative effect on domestic work for young children, and a
neutral effect on income-generating work. At intensive margin they found the same
results, but the magnitudes of the impacts are very different across groups. For instance,
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the effects on schooling are most pronounced for younger children, yet the increased time
at school is not wholly substituted by reduced time at work but by domestic work. Time
spent at income-generating activities does not change significantly after the program for
any of the groups.
Two works in the conditional cash transfer literature by de Janvry et al. (2006)
and Maluccio (2005) evaluated the relationship between economic shocks and the
impacts of CCTs on school enrollment. Researchers de Janvry et al. (2006) found that
Progresa fully protects children’s schooling from the shocks of unemployment and illness
of the household head, but natural disasters in the community but does not prevent
children from working more when their households are hit by a shock. Maluccio (2005)
showed that the Nicaraguan Red de Protección Social protected household’s total food
expenses and children’s school attendance against the effect of the Central America
coffee crisis in 2000–2001. Overall, the literature suggests that shocks reduce school
enrollment and increase child labor, while CCTs have the reverse effect.
The connection between negative income shocks and decreased schooling when
there are credit constraints has been established in a theoretical model by Jacoby and
Skoufias (1997). The empirical equations used in this research are based on predictions
and formulations of this model. Jacoby and Skoufias’ model assumes that households
maximize a utility function defined over current consumption and future children’s
consumption. Parents supply labor inelastically, and their returns are used to finance
current consumption. Children’s time can be used either to further increase current
consumption through work, to accumulate human capital, or for leisure. Human capital
determines children’s future consumption. The household can change the intertemporal
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allocation of consumption by changing the children’s labor supply. The presence of credit
rationing restricts the budget of the household and, if binding, will inefficiently generate
a low level of investment in human capital. Moreover, household income net of
children’s contribution is not certain but rather is subject to shocks. If capital markets
were complete, the realization of such shocks would not affect children’s labor supply, as
they would be insured (Guarcello et al., 2003).
This model (Jacoby & Skoufias, 1997) predicts four possible outcomes for
children’s activities: three corner solutions and one internal solution. A child can attend
school full time, work full time, do neither, or combine work and school. The decision of
a household concerning the activities of its children will be guided by an unobservable
utility as a function of a set of household characteristics including household expected or
permanent income net of children’s contribution, a set of proxies for the rate of returns to
child work and for cost and returns to schooling, and a set of variables relating to credit
rationing, access to public or private insurance mechanisms, and realized shocks
(Guarcello et al., 2003). The model suggests a linear relationship between shocks and
school enrollment. This result is used to motivate an econometric estimation structure
with linear relationships between shocks, schooling, and program impacts, as presented in
section 5.

Child Labor, Shocks, and the Access to Credit Control Variable
The data of this study come from the FA evaluation survey, which was designed
especially for the purposes of evaluating the impact of the program. The survey collected
information on individuals and households located in treatment and control municipalities
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between 2002 and 2005: the baseline survey was in 2002 (before implementation of the
program), the first round was in 2003, and the second round was in 2005. The balanced
panel dataset has information of a total of 30,985 individuals, 13,737 children under 18
years old, and 6,519 households.37
This dataset has several features that make it particularly appropriate for the
empirical analysis in this research. First, the detailed household survey has ample
individual and household characteristics, including information on time use of all
household members aged ten and older. This includes time spent working for wages at
household businesses and non-household business and working without wages doing
household chores. The survey also includes information on different household shocks as
well as measures of access to credit in each of the interviews. As a consequence, the
survey allowed the creation of a valuable balanced panel dataset to model household
behavior under risk.
Child Labor
In Colombia, an estimated 2.5 million children (10.4% of the total population of
children) are forced to work to support their families. Only 60% of all the children in
Colombia leave school with a primary school diploma, and 87% of school-age children
were enrolled in school in 2005. On average, child laborers work about seven to eight
hours per day. Their wages are pitifully low, and most of them receive no health or
unemployment benefits (Bernal & Cardenas, 2005).
School starts at the age of 5 in Colombia, and no significant amount of child labor
is found below the age of 7. The basic cycle of education requires 9 years of study, and

37

Households receiving payments from FA during the baseline survey were excluded, as were
households without complete information on all three surveys.
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other 3 years are needed to finish high school. Thus, children generally finish the basic
cycle at 14 years old and complete school at 17 years old. Although legislation allows
children to work legally from the age of 14, for the purposes of this study, child labor is
defined as the work of children in the age range between 10 and 17 years old.
We use the time allocation data of FA survey to construct binary indicators of
participation in work and school. We consider child labor as a child spending more than
one hour working in economic activities or non-paid work, including household chores
and work in family business.38 Participation in school takes the value of one if the child
is enrolled in school. We also measure hours of work and hours of study and include time
doing homework or other school activities. We focus on four age/sex sub-samples: girls
and boys 10–13 years old and 14–17 years old.
Table 13 gives detailed information on children’s activities in our sample.
Seventy-six percent of the children aged 10–17 years were engaged in work during the
baseline survey. Most were employed in family businesses or household chores (72%). A
significant proportion—64%—were reportedly working and attending school, while 19%
reported attending school only and 12% reported working only. Also, we observed that
between baseline and follow-up surveys participation in schooling increased and
participation in child labor decreased, for both treatment and control municipalities, while
percentage of children that work and study simultaneously remained more or less the
same. This suggests that the children who only work are moving to school, which is the
main objective of the program, but that the program doesn’t prevent children from
working and studying simultaneously. Table 14 shows that child labor is very
38

The concept of child labor by International Labor Organization (ILO) standards is not restricted to only
economic activities.
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heterogeneous according to age and sex and urban vs. rural households. In general, child
labor is most common in rural areas, in boys, and in older children of both sexes.
Table 13. Children’s types of activity, participation percentages
Baseline

Average of First and Second Rounds

Control

Treatment

Total

Control

Treatment

Total

Work only

13.22

11.15

12.37

7.04

5.92

6.58

School only

20.82

17.29

19.38

28.27

21.45

25.5

School and work

61.4

68.65

64.36

61.16

70.68

65.03

None

4.57

2.9

3.89

3.53

1.95

2.89

Observations

7,485

5,120

12,605

7,485

5,120

12,605

Table 14. Child labor by group, participation percentages
Baseline

First Rounds

Urban

9.9

8.0

Rural

19.4

16.1

Boys

17.4

13

Girls

7.9

7.8

Ages 7–9

3.9

3.1

Ages 10–11

10.7

6.7

Ages 12–14

16.6

12.6

Ages 15–17

27.6

25.7

Observations

12605

12605

Table 15 shows the average number of hours children work and attend school. In
the pooled data, children worked an average of 4 hours per day and studied an average of
4 hours per day at baseline. Hours reported for school activities increased in the
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following surveys by 1.5 hours, and time at work decreased by only 1/4 of an hour. Mean
school hours were lower for treatment municipalities at baseline and increased after
program participation. The inverse relation is observed for work hours, which decreased
after treatment. It is noticeable that time at school increases for both treatment and
control households, while time at work remains constant for control households. This
evidence suggests that the increased time at school could be not a result of the program
but of other observed or unobserved effects.
Table 15. Children’s time use, number of hours by sex/age groups
Baseline

Average of First and Second Rounds

Total

Treatment

Control

Total

Treatment

Control

4.01

4.36

3.72

3.74

3.73

3.75

Boys 10–13

3.55

3.92

3.20

3.30

3.27

3.32

Girls 10–13

3.17

3.56

2.84

2.90

2.91

2.90

Boys 14–17

5.05

5.33

4.83

5.12

5.18

5.07

Girls 14–17

4.03

4.45

3.68

3.87

3.84

3.89

4.00

3.34

4.46

5.44

5.51

5.39

Boys 10–13

3.49

2.99

3.84

4.92

5.12

4.78

Girls 10–13

3.45

2.94

3.81

5.00

5.02

5.00

Boys 14–17

5.18

3.96

5.96

6.57

6.65

6.51

Girls 14–17

5.59

4.72

6.18

6.98

6.92

7.02

21,605

5,120

7,485

21,605

5,120

7,485

Work

School

Observations

Shocks
The variables used to identify the various shocks experienced by households in
Colombia were obtained from direct questions in the evaluation surveys. In each of the
three survey rounds, the households were asked whether during the last year the
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household experienced the following shocks: crop or job loss, severe illness of the
household head, death of a household member, bankruptcy, a weather shock,39 or violent
attack or displacement. The prevalence of different types of shocks at the household level
during each of the cross-section surveys, for the sample of households in treatment and
control municipalities, is reported in Table 16. In total, 50% of the households had at
least one shock between baseline and follow-up surveys. No statistical difference was
observed between treatment and control households for any of the shocks.
Data shows that exposure of the households to crop or job loss is very high—
more than 11% of households had at least one crop or job loss. Around 12% of the
households reported having the household head ill for more than two weeks at least once
over the year prior to the survey. Death of a household member, weather shock, and a
household being a victim of violence are less frequent. However, we consider them in the
analysis as they can be very harmful to poor families because they not only result in loss
of income but also in increased household expenditure.

39

Fire, flood, or other catastrophic weather events.
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Table 16. Frequency of shocks on households by treatment and control groups
Crop
Loss or
Job Loss

Illness
Household
Head

Bankruptcy

Death
Household
Member

Weather

Violence or
Displacement

Baseline
Control

11.39%

12.40%

2.20%

1.81%

1.55%

1.16%

Treatment

9.58%

13.96%

2.14%

2.01%

0.95%

1.02%

T-test
(p value)

0.483

0.636

0.777

0.709

0.615

0.808

Control

12.66%

12.66%

1.81%

1.06%

0.95%

Treatment

13.50%

11.28%

2.93%

2.54%

1.25%

1.48%

T-test
(p value)

0.545

0.645

0.323

0.085

0.913

0.136

Control

12.25%

10.11%

2.09%

5.95%

1.50%

Treatment

13.67%

10.60%

2.39%

5.57%

1.89%

First Round
2.47%

Second Round
2.87%
2.61%

0.563
0.574
0.193
0.598
0.469
0.536
T-test
(p value)
Note: Percentage of households hit by a shock during a year previous to the survey. T-test of difference in
household means computed clustering at the municipality level.

Control Variables
Table 17 compares mean values of observable characteristics for treatment and
control municipalities. The variables included are education, sex, and ages of the child
and the head of the household; age composition of the household; number of private and
public schools, health centers, and banks in each municipality; and the geographical
region where the municipality is located. Other variables are included in order to control
for access to some form of insurance: dummies for households that have credit or savings
in a bank, if household own a house or land as a measure of collateral, and have health
insurance for all family members, dummy variables for less-insured households such as

66

households whose main occupation is agriculture, and a dummy for households headed
by a single parent.
Access to credit is a very important variable in the theoretical model used in this
research. As a measure of access to credit we use the possession of assets and possession
of credit. The possession of assets provides an indication of both the well-being of the
household and, by serving as collateral, its ability to borrow money. About 64% of the
treatment households are home-owners and about 15 percent of the sample report holding
land assets distinct from the land on which they live. Land ownership is much more
common in rural areas, as is home ownership. On the other hand, the actual use of credit
is very limited, even in municipalities with the presence of a bank. there are not
differences in use of credit between treatment and control municipalities prior to the
program. Only 5% of the households got loans to buy a house or land, and only 2% got
loans from financial institutions for other purposes. However, there were significantly
more households with actual debts in treatment municipalities than in control
municipalities in the following surveys. In regard to savings in credit institutions, only
2% of households had savings, and there were not statistical significant differences
among treatment and control municipalities.

67

Table 17. Summary statistics of main variables at baseline survey
Control

Treatment

Children
Age

12.240

(2.235)

12.201

(2.280)

Sex (Boys)a

0.535

(0.504)

0.533

(0.505)

School grade

3.627

(1.023)

3.609

(0.989)

Age

47.118

(11.906)

46.377

(11.630)

Incomplete elementary school

0.466

(0.507)

0.453

(0.503)

Complete elementary school

0.148

(0.354)

0.149

(0.347)

Incomplete secondary school

0.083

(0.269)

0.097

(0.295)

Complete secondary school

0.030

(0.181)

0.042

(0.199)

Household size

5.612

(1.771)

5.548

(1.765)

Number of children 0–6

0.711

(0.962)

0.805

(0.966)

Members 7–13

1.624

(1.053)

1.715

(1.074)

Members 14–17

1.311

(0.971)

1.234

(0.948)

Health insurancea

0.858

(0.349)

0.910

(0.286)

If have debta

0.057

(0.260)

0.071

(0.291)

Own a house or landa

0.683

(0.477)

0.654

(0.481)

Occupation agriculturea

0.116

(0.165)

0 .105

(0.156)

Single parenta

0.196

(0.394)

0.187

(0.398)

Household Head

Household Composition

Access to Insurance
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Control

Treatment

Municipality
No. private schools

4.632

(8.626)

3.788

(9.472)

No. public schools

37.391

(29.920)

43.334

(29.993)

No. banks

0.874

(1.585)

1.786

(2.423)

No. health centers

9.989

(11.258)

10.182

(8.457)

Rurala

0.443

(0.497)

0.556

(0.497)

Observations

7721

5198

Notes: Averages based on three rounds. Standard errors in parenthesis. a Mean values of dummy variables
represent percentages of children living in households that meet each of the conditions of the variables.

Methodology and Econometric Model
In this section we discuss the specifications used to examine the effect of shocks
on child labor and schooling and whether FA might protect households from using
children as risk-coping instruments. First, we examine the effect of shocks on school
attendance prior to the program for treatment and control households. In addition, we test
if access to credit prevents households from using children as risk-coping instruments.
The role of credit is very important in the theoretical model used to formulate the
econometric equations estimated in this paper. According to the theoretical model,
households don’t have to rely on self-insurance instruments to smooth consumption
under the complete credit markets assumption.
To test the assumption that credit-constrained households have a higher
probability of taking children out of school to buffer adverse income shocks we use
retrospective questions from the baseline survey about school attendance and shocks the
year 2001. We exclude households receiving payments from FA prior to the baseline
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survey. Results from this equation provide evidence regarding to what extent poor rural
households in Colombia use children as risk-coping instruments as well as the role of
credit in household consumption smoothing. We use the following specification:
K; =  +
@; =  + 

;

+ :; + ;

; +

 +

; 

(6)
+ :;
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(7)

The dependent variable SE is a dummy variable that indicates whether children
were enrolled in school and attended more than 85% of the classes each year, and CL
indicates whether children received any income during the same year, with subscripts
representing the child i, household j, and time t. S is our measure of the income shock; C
measures households’ access to credit; W is a dummy for each year of the survey; and X
contains a set of controls including individual, household, and community characteristics.
Equations (6) and (7) are estimated by a fixed-effects logit model.
We anticipate transitory shocks to lead to a decrease in school attendance thus we
expect  < 0 in Equation (6), and  > 0 (an increase in child labor) in Equation (7).
To investigate if the effect of shocks on child labor is due to credit constraints, we
examine whether the effect of shocks varies with households’ access to credit. The effect
of interest is  , which captures the differential impact of a shock among households with
access to credit. To the extent that we believe  > 0 in Equation (7) is due to credit
constraints, we expect access to credit to mitigate the effect of shocks, i.e.,  < 0 .
Second, we estimate the effect of being a beneficiary of the FA program on child
labor and school enrollment, controlling for access to credit and different income shocks.
For that we use a difference-in-difference (DiD) framework, under the assumptions that,
conditional on observed individual, household, and community characteristics,
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unobserved community characteristics do not change before or after the program and
there are common time effects across treatment and control areas. The basic DiD
equation is represented by Equation (8):
>c =  +  c + 
:c + c + c
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+
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The dependent variable is a dummy variable that indicates if children work full
time, attend school full time, or combine school with work, with subscripts representing
the child i, community c, and time t. Sit is our measure of income shocks at household and
community levels for the year prior to the survey; Tc is a dummy variable indicating
whether the child lives in a treatment municipality;
c measures households’ access to credit; ; and c contains a set of controls including

individual, household, and community characteristics. The two error terms are c , which
captures all observed and unobserved household or individual level time invariant factors,
and εr , which captures the unobserved idiosyncratic household or individual and timevarying error. Equation (8) is also estimated for child labor and schooling hours. As
before, we anticipate income shocks to lead to an increase in child labor if insurance is
limited, i.e., we expect  > 0 and we expect credit access and FA to mitigate the effect
of shocks and displace child labor as an instrument to buffer shocks, or e , f and g < 0,
being g higher in absolute value if credit access reinforces the insurance role of FA, or
viceversa. . For this model we use observations at baseline data and at each of the
following surveys (one year and three years after the implementation of the program).
However, we show only the estimated coefficients for the second round of the survey.
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The main concern for the empirical analysis is that not randomization of the
program may have created heterogeneous characteristics between control and treatment
populations. Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1997) suggested that nonparametric
conditional DiD, or DiD matching estimators, help eliminate initial heterogeneity while
at the same time taking advantage of DiD’s ability to control for time-invariant
characteristics. Compared to the original matching estimator, this method allows for
unobserved determinants of participation since it does not require that selection bias is
eliminated by conditioning on the observed covariates, only that the bias is the same in
the pre- and post-treatment periods. Compared to pure DiD, this estimator has the
advantage of being nonparametric, so that successful identification does not depend on
specific functional forms for the respective expectations (Heckman et al., 1997).
We estimate the effect of the program on our different dependent variables using
non-parametric kernel propensity score, without replacement, controlling for observable
characteristics and imposing common support restrictions. Separate estimates are
calculated by each of the shocks analyzed. The estimated effect of the program ATT
represents the difference of the mean values of the outcome variables between treatment
and control groups and between baseline and second round survey.

Results
Table 18 and Table 19 report estimates of shock variables ( and  ) on school
attendance and child labor prior to the program according with equations (6) and (7).
Shock variables are measured as binary variables that indicate when a household
experienced any of the following shocks during the year prior to the interview: crop or
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job loss, illness of a household head, death of a household member, bankruptcy, violence,
or a weather shock. According to the survey, these shocks are considered severe shock
events. We estimated equations for each shock separately and for a set of pooled binary
variable of households that experienced one, two, and three of the above shocks during
the year prior to the survey.40 Regressions were run for age/sex groups, with all
specifications control for community-time fixed effects.
Our results suggest that for the specific shocks under scrutiny, children’s
probability of school attendance is not affected by income shocks with the exception of
weather shocks, which increase the probability of school enrollment for boys between 14
and 17 years old.41 However, we observe that idiosyncratic shocks such as illness and
death increase the probability of child labor. Specifically, illness of the household head
increases the probability of work by 30% for older boys, while or job loss shocks increase
the probability of work by 28% and 18% for older boys and young girls, respectively. On
average, a severe income shock increases the probability that young girls and older boys
work by 18% approximately.
Parameter estimations of the interaction term of access to credit with shocks
indicate that households with access to credit are less likely to increase children’s labor to
buffer shocks.42 This result is in line with the predictions of our theoretical model.
Finally, we observe that households located in rural areas and households dedicated to

40

Alternatively, we measured shocks as negative changes in reported labor income between the two
periods considered. However, we did not find significant estimates for this measure of shocks.
41
Although this finding goes against the predictions of our model, we explain it by the fact that
weather shocks might reduce labor demand, particularly in agricultural jobs
42
We don’t interact access to credit with specific shocks because the number of observations with
positive values is very small and in some cases is equal to zero for all observations.
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agricultural business are positively strongly correlated with child labor, increasing the
probability that children work by more than 30%.43
Table 18. Probability of school enrollment for children 10–17 prior to FA: Fixed effects
Probit Model

Death of a household

Boys 7–13

Girls 7–13

Boys 14–17

Girls 14–17

0.050

0.202

–0.122

0.198

(0.21)

(0.16)

(0.17)

(0.20)

–0.190

–0.004

0.152

–0.149

(0.11)

(0.12)

(0.12)

(0.15)

0.052

–0.021

0.031

–0.011

(0.08)

(0.10)

(0.10)

(0.13)

0.179

0.188

0.313**

0.450

(0.13)

(0.20)

(0.06)

(0.33)

0.025

–0.153

–0.054

–0.112

(0.23)

(0.16)

(0.25)

(0.26)

–0.046

–0.001

0.060

0.055

(0.06)

(0.07)

(0.07)

(0.08)

0.084

0.034

0.069

0.053

(0.06)

(0.07)

(0.07)

(0.08)

0.076

0.086

0.032

0.093

(0.06)

(0.07)

(0.07)

(0.08)

member

Severe illness of the hh head

Crop or job loss

Weather shock

Violence shock

One shock

Two shocks

Three shocks

Notes: Shock variables are binary variables that indicate households that experienced a shock during the
year previous to the survey. Robust standard errors, clustered at the municipality level, are in parentheses.
Additional repressors were included but not reported. Municipality-year effects are included. Each
individual coefficient is statistically significant at the *10%, **5%, or ***1% level.

43

Estimations for control variables are available upon request.
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Table 19. Probability of work for children 10–17 prior to FA: Fixed effects Tobit Model

Death of a household

Boys 7–13

Girls 7–13

Boys 14–17

Girls 14–17

–0.180

–0.101

–0.283

–0.183

(0.17)

(0.18)

(0.16)

(0.16)

0.168

0.167

0.301*

–0.040

(0.12)

(0.16)

(0.14)

(0.20)

–0.007

0.188*

0.286*

0.145

(0.12)

(0.09)

(0.12)

(0.03)

0.222

0.197

0.337

0.206

(0.34)

(0.20)

(0.21)

(0.15)

0.237

0.391

0.046

–0.160

(0.27)

(0.34)

(0.18)

(0.31)

0.106

0.197*

0.173*

0.074

(0.07)

(0.08)

(0.08)

(0.08)

–0.063

–0.059*

–0.135***

–0.107**

(0.07)

(0.02)

(0.03)

(0.03)

0.126*

0.169*

0.178*

0.164**

(0.02)

(0.03)

(0.03)

(0.02)

–0.068*

–0.085*

–0.173*

0.122**

(0.02)

(0.03)

(0.03)

(0.02)

member

Severe illness of the hh head

Crop or job loss

Weather shock

Violence shock

One shock

*Access to Credit

More than one shocks

*Access to Credit

Notes: Shock variables are binary variables that indicate households that experienced a shock during the
year previous to the survey. Robust standard errors, clustered at the municipality level, are in parentheses.
Additional repressors were included but not reported. Municipality-year effects are included. Each
individual coefficient is statistically significant at the *10%, **5%, or ***1% level.

To sum up, we observe that poor households in Colombia don’t take children out
of school to buffer shocks, but credit-constrained households do increase children’s
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participation in work activities. This is an interesting result since evaluations of other
CCT programs such as Progresa in Mexico and Red de Protección Social in Nicaragua
(de Janvry et al., 2006; Maluccio, 2005) have assumed that parents take children out of
school when they face income shocks.44 Besides, the basic theoretical model that
describes household decisions regarding education under uncertainty (Jacoby & Skoufias,
1997) predicts a decrease in school enrollment when households face income shocks.
In addition, these findings support the idea that schooling and child labor are not
substitutes (Ravallion & Wodon, 2000) and that shocks might affect children’s time use
at intensive margin rather than at extensive margin. That is, it is possible that income
shocks increase the hours of children’s labor without reducing time at school, or increase
the proportion of children that work and study simultaneously. Thus, the effect of shocks
will be absorbed by the study and leisure time of the children.
Results from this section support the following conclusions: (i) poor rural
households use child labor to cope with income shocks, but at the expense of the leisure
or studying time of children, not at expense of school enrollment; (ii) shocks have
heterogeneous effects on children by age and sex; (iii) the relationship between economic
shocks and school attendance is in most of the cases insignificant, and different types of
shocks are likely the product of heterogeneous impacts; (iv) as predicted by the model,
credit-constrained households have a higher probability of using child labor as a riskcoping instrument; and (v) the effect of shocks should account for complementarities of
schooling and working activities. These results are used to construct our empirical
equations in the following section to estimate the effect of the FA program on children’s
schooling and working time use.
44

These studies have no pre-baseline data that allow them to test such assumptions.
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Impact of FA on Children’s Time Use Under Risk
Table 20 shows the estimated average treatment effect on the treatment (ATT) 45
of the FA program on (i) children’s school and work hours and (ii) participation in school
full time or work full time or the combination of school and work. Impact of the program
is estimated using DiD matching methods for each of the shock events considered in this
paper, i.e., death of a household member, illness of the household head, crop or job loss,
weather, and violence shocks.46 Alternatively, we estimate ATT of FA for the whole
sample of households that have been hit by any of the shock events under evaluation, and
for households that have hit by more than one shock. We also estimate the effect of the
program for households with access to credit and for credit constrained households, under
the assumption that the program will serve as safety net for those households.
Considering shocks one at a time, we see that illness of the household head or
crop loss increase by 1.25 the average number of school hours for beneficiary households
with respect of not been in the program and reduces the number of work hours for
children by 0.3 hours. Estimations show that the program consistently reduces the
number of hours of child labor and increases the number of schooling hours for
households under shocks. As we have observed that households are not likely to take
children out of school when they face income shocks, our estimates suggest that the
estimated positive effect of the program on schooling hours is on children’s time doing
homework and studying instead of attending school, which is fixed in many of the cases.
We also observe that access to credit does not reinforce the effect of the program
on displacing child labor as a risk-coping instrument and have also an insignificant effect
45

We exclude households that are not receiving payments.
We are not able to find a good counterfactual for the subsample of households hit by bankruptcy
shocks, so don’t present results.

46
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on schooling hours. In general, the mitigating effect of the program of adverse shocks on
schooling hours is always higher than the mitigating effect of the program on working
hours, meaning that the program is more effective at protecting schooling time than at
reducing child labor under risk environments. Finally, we see that the program has a
higher effect on work time when households face covariate shocks, such as weather and
violence shocks, than idiosyncratic shocks. On average, the program increases 1.5
schooling hours, decreases 0.5 working hours for households exposed to shocks.
At the extensive margin, results are also very interesting. For all shocks
considered, the program has small or no effects on the probability of children working or
studying full time but very important effects on the probability of children working and
studying simultaneously. We observe that being a beneficiary of the program increases
the probability that children work and study simultaneously by 10% for illness of the
household head, by 7% for crop or job loss or violence, and by 8% for households hit by
any shock event. We also see that FA increases the probability that children study full
time by 4% for households hit by illness of the household head or crop or job loss shocks
and reduces the probability that children work full time by 4% for households hit by
violence shocks.
For households hit by at least one shock, the program has no significant effect on
school enrollment but protects children from working full time. As we observed at the
intensive margin, access to credit has no significant effect on child labor when
households are hit by one shock. The effect of credit became significant for households
hit by more than one shock, protecting that children combine work and school. Therefore,
we provide evidence that the FA program is effective in reducing child labor even for
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households under risk and provides strong incentives to combine work and school for
children under shocks for credit constrained households but not for households with
access to credit.
If we compare the impact of the program on households with shocks with the
effect of the program in households with no shocks, we find that the program does not
fully mitigate the effects of adverse shocks on school and work hours. We find that for
households with no shocks the FA program increases schooling hours by 3.18 hours and
reduces working hours by 1.05 hours. Thus, at the intensive margin, the effect of the
program on households without shocks more than doubles the effect of the program on
households with shocks.
At the extensive margin we see that for households without shocks the program
increases the probability that children study full time by 5%, increases the probability that
they combine school and work by 4%, and reduces the probability that they work full
time by 10%. Therefore, the program FA does not fully mitigate the effect of shocks on
child labor and child schooling participation decisions but provides some insurance that
children will remain enrolled in school by increasing the probability that children
combine work and school.
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Table 20. Average treatment effect of FA program for the second round of the survey
Intensive Margin

Extensive Margin

Work
Hours
–1.0730*

Study Only

Work Only

Death of a household member

School
Hours
2.2486***

–0.0434

–0.0043

School and
Work
0.0297

Illness of the household head

(0.9114)
1.1594***

(0.7608)
–0.3607*

(0.0913)
0.0390*

(0.0984)
–0.011

(0.1224)
0.1024***

Crop or job loss

(0.3021)
1.3328***

(0.2418)
–0.3737**

(0.0277)
0.0451**

(0.0277)
–0.0281

(0.0368)
0.0787***

Weather

(0.2643)
2.4025*

(0.2079)
–2.1843**

(0.0247)
0.0062

(0.0259)
–0.1079

(0.0331)
0.0773

Violence or displacement

(1.5872)
2.2522**

(1.1538)
–2.0045**

(0.1974)
0.0749

(0.2066)
–0.0436***

(0.2506)
0.0734***

One shock

(1.2550)
1.4277***

(0.8991)
–0.4904***

(0.1466)
–0.0309

(0.0250)
–0.0301**

(0.0326)
0.0846**

*Access to credit

(0.1879)
0.7853

(0.1489)
–0.2684

(0.1178)
0.0585

(0.0180)
–0.0341

(0.0236)
-0.1488

More than shock

(0.4473)
1.4624***

(0.8385)
–0.5628***

(0.7574)
0.0209

(0.5426)
–0.0301**

(0.3242)
0.0856***

*Access to credit

(0.1879)
0.3653

(0.1489)
–0.4672

(0.6836)
0.0275*

(0.0145)
–0.0638**

(0.0158)
-0.0362***

(0.5621)

(0.7849)

(0.0178)

(0.0180)

(0.0236)

3.1871*
(0.3732)

–1.0529**
(0.2841)

0.0522***
(0.0103)

–0.1026*
(0.0489)

0.0486**
(0.0114)

&o shock

Notes: Shock variables are binary variables that indicate households that experienced a shock during the
year previous to the survey. Imbens’ standard errors, clustered at the municipality level, are in parentheses.
Additional repressors were included but not reported. Each individual coefficient is statistically significant
at the *10%, **5%, or ***1% level.

In general, we observe that the FA program effectively displaces costly riskcoping instruments such as child labor and protects study time, not school enrollment, for
households under specific shocks, and that access to credit provides some insurance for
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reducing child labor when households are hit by more than one shock. These results
complement previous findings and provide evidence to much of the conjectures in the
literature. Previous studies have found that CCT programs protect enrollment but don’t
prevent parents from increasing child work in response to shocks, suggesting that
children combine school and work. Until now, this internal solution hasn’t been tested in
the program evaluation literature. This study finds strong evidence that beneficiaries of
the program have a higher probability of increasing the child labor supply to buffer
shocks in special for credit constrained households but keeping children enrolled in
school than if they were not in the program.

Conclusions
CCTs such as FA provide cash to poor families imposing conditions in children
school attendance. Recent empirical work has suggested that CCTs may be one of the
policy instruments that enable households to better cope with adverse economic shocks.
For instance, if the effect of the condition on school attendance, acting as a price effect, is
much larger than the income effect of economic shocks, then CCTs can protect children’s
education under risk. In addition, if school and work are substitutes we can expect that
increasing schooling will displace child labor as a risk-coping instrument. However, there
is strong evidence that the relation between school and work is not one to one and that
child work rather displaces study time or leisure time.
This paper goes beyond previous studies by testing the effect of a CCT and
income shocks on schooling and labor decisions, allowing for complementarities between
school and work activities, and controlling for the credit constraints. Using a panel
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dataset from the evaluation survey of a CCT program implemented in Colombia,
Familias en Accion, we observe that shocks are highly prevalent and that children’s
participation in work activities is very high. Based on a theoretical model of human
capital accumulation under uncertainty with incomplete markets, our empirical
estimations suggest that poor rural households in Colombia use child labor to cope with
income shocks at the expense of the children’s leisure or studying time, not at the
expense of school enrollment. This is an interesting result, as most studies assume
substitutability between school and work. In line with the model predictions, we also find
that credit-constrained households have a higher probability of using children as riskcoping instruments.
With respect to the safety net value of FA, we find that the program provides
strong incentives for children to combine work and school when households are exposed
to shocks. Results reveal that CCT programs can work as insurance for the schooling of
the poor but are not able to completely displace costly risk-coping strategies such as child
labor. Therefore, the role of FA on the safety net of the uninsured will depend on the
future returns of studying time at home. That is, if combining school and work results in
lower future returns of schooling, then the benefits of the program as a safety net are
going to be negligible. Alternatively, if attending school is enough for human capital
accumulation, we can say that CCTs serve as a safety net program.
This paper contributes to the literature of household behavior under uncertainty
and provides insight into the potentialities of a specific CCT program, Familias en
Accion, to protect households from using costly risk management strategies under
imperfect credit markets. We show that child labor plays a significant role as a self-
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insurance strategy of poor households in Colombia. From a policy perspective, results
from this research are very useful, as they provide evidence of the unintended effects of a
broad program in Colombia and therefore in its potentialities to effectively reduce
poverty in the long term.
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Chapter 3 . INTRAHOUSEHOLD TIME ALLOCATION

Introduction
Conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs have been implemented in many
developing countries in an effort to increase human capital and poverty alleviation. These
programs provide monetary grants to poor families on the condition that the families keep
their children in school and take them to regular visits to health clinics. In trying to
accomplish these objectives, CCT programs may affect beneficiary families in many
dimensions. These include the level and patterns of consumption, the health conditions of
family members, investment in human and physical capital, and the labor supply of
children and adults. In this paper we focus on the effects of CCT programs on
intrahousehold time allocation on various activities—market work, domestic labor,
school, and leisure for children and adults.
A number of studies have shown CCT programs to be effective in increasing
school enrollment and reducing child labor (Attanasio et al, 2006; Schultz, 2004).
Besides estimating the impact of CCT programs on child labor, the empirical analysis
presented here will also shed some light on which household members change their labor
supply decisions in response to the program. Although the program is neutral in terms of
adult labor supply incentives, if exogenous changes in the income of the household
impact children’s work and school enrollment, there is a potential for effects on the labor
supply of adults in beneficiary households.
In principle, CCT programs can be considered as having income and price effects.
The cash transfer increases household income, which in turn increases both consumption
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and leisure, reducing labor supply of all households’ members. This is the income effect.
The price effect is associated with meeting the conditionalities of the program. The
condition on school attendance implies a reduction in the shadow wage of children,
which would result in an increase in the amount of time children spent in school relative
to work. Induced changes in the allocation of time of children are likely to generate a
reallocation of time of parents. These are the cross-substitution effects. That is, if children
become unable to perform certain work or domestic activities, other household members
(adults) may substitute for their work. Therefore, the impact of the CCT program in the
allocation of time of household members is ambiguous under economic theory. We
address this question empirically, taking into account the substitution possibilities in the
time of family members used in household production, paid work, and leisure.
The Colombian government has been operating the CCT program Familias en
Accion (FA) since 2002. For the purpose of rigorous evaluation, control municipalities
were carefully chosen to be as similar as possible to the treated ones. Between 2002 and
2005, one pre-intervention and two follow-up survey instruments collected data on
education, labor, income, and health at individual, household, and community levels.
Time use diary data was collected for all household members above 10 years old during
all three rounds. The availability of this data offers an extraordinary setting in which to
analyze time allocation responses to exogenous changes in income.
In Colombia, labor markets are characterized by very high labor force
participation rates of men in paid work and very low labor market participation rates of
women. In addition, children tend to begin their labor force participation at early ages.
One of the principal objectives of FA is to increase beneficiary children’s enrollment in
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and attendance at school and thereby reduce early labor force participation. In the impact
evaluation of FA, Attanasio et al. (2006) found that the program increased school
participation by 6 percentage points for children 14 to 17 years old and by 2 percentage
points for younger children. In terms of work, participation in domestic work decreased
by around 10% to 12% for younger children, but participation in income-generating work
remained largely unaffected. Evaluation of the impact of the program on adult time
allocation has not been addressed yet.
Results show that the program affects time allocation of children and adults and
that there are important substitution effects among household members and across
activities. Using time use data after attending school for children enrolled in school
before the program, we find a positive effect of the program on schooling hours ,
however the effect of the program on labor of children already enrolled in school is
insignificant. We also observe some patterns of substitution between activities for
children attending school as a result of the program. We find that the program increases
the leisure time of boys, displacing paid work, but reduces the leisure time of girls,
increasing domestic labor.
The paper also examines the effect of the program on adults’ time use. The most
surprising result is the increased labor supply of the adults in the program. Particularly,
we find that males increase paid work at the expense of domestic labor and that females
increase domestic labor at the expense of leisure time. In order to provide an explanation
of these results, we analyze the effect of males’, females’, boys’, and girls’ wages on the
labor supply equations of adults and children. We find important substitution and
complementary relations among household members. We observe that hours of domestic
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work between girls and female adults of the household are complementary and that hours
in labor market activities between males and boys are substitutes. These crosssubstitution effects explain the increased labor supply in paid work for male adults and in
domestic labor for female adults as a response to the CCT program.
This study contributes to the literature providing evidence regarding the labor
supply responses of children and adults to CCT programs and their interaction among
household members. Evidence of the extent to which these transfers result in significant
effects on the adult labor supply is quite scarce (Cuesta, 2004; Foguel and Barros, 2008;
Parker and Skoufias, 2000) and, in most cases, weak due to the lack of good data on time
use of household members. The design of the FA program and the availability of panel
data on individual time allocation offer a great opportunity to analyze intrahousehold
time allocation in a context of policy intervention. Whether policy interventions constrain
the time of some or all household members can have crucial impacts on the success of the
program and future well-being of beneficiaries.
This paper is organized as follows. The next section provides an overview of the
program and a description of the evaluation sample used for the empirical analysis.
Section 3 reviews the literature on time allocation. Section 4 discusses the hypothesis of
the program effects within a unitary model framework. Sections 5 and 6 describe the data
and the empirical strategy used in the analysis. Estimation results are presented in section
7, and section 8 concludes.
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Familias en Acción
The program Familias en Acción is a welfare program run by the Colombian
government to foster the accumulation of human capital in rural Colombia. It is similar to
other CCT programs, such as Progresa, in Mexico (now called Oportunidades); Red de
Proteccion Social, in Nicaragua; and Bolsa Familia, in Brazil, that have been
implemented in middle-income countries during the last decade in an effort to break the
intergenerational transmission of poverty. The FA program is aimed primarily at
improving the education, health, and nutrition of poor families. The nutrition component
consists of a basic monetary supplement that is given to all beneficiary families with
children under seven years of age. The health component consists of vaccinations and
growth and development checks for children, as well as courses on nutrition, hygiene,
and contraception for their mothers. Participation in the health component is a
precondition for receiving the benefits of the nutritional component. All children between
7 and 18 years old are eligible for the educational component. To receive the grant, they
must attend classes during at least 85% of the school days in each school month as well
as during the whole academic year. The size of the grant increases for secondary
education and is equal for girls and boys. The amount of the subsidy on a monthly basis
at the time of the baseline survey was 14,000 Colombian pesos (COP) or (US$6) for each
child attending primary school and COP$28,000 or (US$12) for each child attending
secondary school in 2005. The nutritional supplement47 is paid to families with children
aged between 0 and 6 years. The amount is COP$46,500 or (US$20) per family per

47

This subsidy is an alternative to participation in a pre-existing program called Hogares Comunitarios.
Beneficiaries cannot participate in both programs with the same children. However, families with children
both under and over the age of 6 can choose to send the young children to a Hogar Comunitario and to
participate in FA with the older children.
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month. The average transfer received per household is COP$61,500, which represents
approximately 25% of average household income of beneficiary households. In general,
all the transfers are received by the female head of the household every two months.
Familias en Acción determined household eligibility in two stages: first by
identifying target communities and then by choosing low-income households within
those communities. Selection criteria for target communities were based on the following
conditions. The town must: (i) have fewer than 100,000 inhabitants and not be a
departmental capital, (ii) have sufficient education and health infrastructures, (iii) have a
bank, and (iv) have a municipality administrative office with relatively up-to-date welfare
lists and other official documents deemed important. A subset of 622 of the 1,060
Colombian municipalities qualified for the program. Eligible households were those
registered at SISBEN48 level 1 at the end of December 1999, with children under 17 years
old, living in the target municipalities. SISBEN 1 households account for roughly the
lowest quintile of Colombia’s household income distribution (Attanasio, 2004).
The program started operating in the latter half of 2002.49 It has benefited
approximately 1,500,000 households since its beginning, and the cost has ascended to the
sum of 300 thousands of millions of Colombian pesos annually (US$150 million). The
cost of the program corresponds to the 0.5% of the Colombian GDP and represents
approximately 10% of educational expenditures in the country.
The Evaluation Sample
For evaluation purposes, it was decided to construct a representative stratified
sample of treatment municipalities and to choose control municipalities among those that
48

SISBEN, Sistema Unificado de Beneficiarios, is a six-level poverty indicator used in Colombia to target
welfare programs and for the pricing of utilities.
49
In a few municipalities the program started as early as the end of 2001.
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were excluded from the program but that belonged within the same strata. The strata were
determined by region and by an index of infrastructure based on health and education.
The control towns were chosen within the same stratum to be as similar as possible to
each of the treatment towns, in terms of population, area, and quality of life index. Most
of the control municipalities were towns with basic school and health infrastructures but
without banks or, in the few cases chosen to match relatively large municipalities, just
over 100,000 inhabitants. As a consequence, control towns are broadly comparable to
treatment towns (Attanasio, 2004). In the end, the evaluation sample was made up of 122
municipalities, 57 of which were treatment and 65 of which were controls.
For each municipality, approximately 100 eligible households were included in
the evaluation sample. The total evaluation sample consists of 11,462 households
interviewed between June and October 2002 (baseline survey), 10,742 households
interviewed between July and November 2003 (first wave), and 9,566 households
interviewed between November 2005 and April 2006 (second wave). The attrition rate
between the three rounds was approximately 16%.50 Most of the observations lost were
households which children´ age exceeded the required age or households that move from
their location and were no possible to find again. Compliance was very high,51 more than
97% of the eligible households participate in the program, so for the analysis we include
in the sample all observations from treatment municipalities.
The final longitudinal data used in this study include information from 6,519
repeated households, after excluding households that received payments before the
50

According to Attanasio (2007) attrition between baseline survey and the second follow up survey
is not statistically different between treatment and control households. Therefore we assume that
lost of observations is random.
51
The main reason for no compliance was lack of the required documents for registration. None of
the households reported lack of interest of participation in the program.
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baseline survey and households located in control municipalities that received payments
during the second survey52. At the household level, the sample consists of families that
are potential beneficiaries of the program—that is, households with children from the
poorest sector of society. Data are collected at both the household and the individual
level. The available data provide a rich set of variables that allows us to measure
consumption of durables and non-durables, family composition, household sociodemographic structure, labor supply, nutritional status of children, education, household
assets, income, and different shocks to income, for both rural and urban households.

Intrahousehold Time Allocation: A Review
The analysis of time use is essentially an analysis of the allocation of time to
various activities such as work for wages, work in the family business, domestic chores,
and school activities for children. Becker (1965), and later Gronau (1977), extended the
conventional labor supply model of consumption and leisure by incorporating home
production as another labor activity. They argue that work at home (or home production)
will respond to economic incentives such as changes in market wages, unearned income,
and productivity in a way similar to market work.
In the context of determinants of intrahousehold time allocation, several studies
have econometrically addressed the effects of age, gender, household composition,
market prices, and other variables on the time allocation of household members. Ellis
(1994) presents a good survey of descriptive studies of time allocation patterns in rural
households in developing countries. The studies consistently find that (i) female time use

52

A total of 13 municipalities of the control sample were converted to treatment municipalities in
2005, before the second wave of the evaluation survey.
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is more elastic with respect to her and her partner’s wage rates than male time use as well
as to the presence of young children in the house, (ii) roles and cultural norms are
important determinants of time use and ignoring them introduces bias in time use
equations, and (iii) non-wage income deters labor force participation by raising
reservation wages and increases the consumption of leisure.
Evidence of the cross-substitution effects between child labor and adult labor
supply is very scarce. Skoufias (1994) estimates the interrelationships amongst market
wage rates and the time allocated by adult male, adult female, and younger household
members in market work, home production, and schooling and finds that wage rates of
both adults and children are important determinants of adults’ and children’s time use.
From this study it can be concluded that if labor markets exist there appears to be an
association between adult and child time, usually between the mother and the daughter.
Thus, an increase in female wages can increase the female labor supply to market
activities and a subsequent pulling in of girls into housework.
In spite of the existing literature on time allocation patterns of households, there
are some issues that still remain to be developed. First, few studies include non-market
activities, such as domestic labor, as dependent variables, and fewer still are able to
include the time men spend on household chores, primarily because of data limitations.
Most of the studies focus only on the labor supply of some household members, usually
that of men and women in the household. However, a large number of activities in
developing countries occur in the house, so accounting for such activities is very
important when we want to determine the welfare of the household as a whole. Second,
while there is evidence that household time is not equally distributed across members,
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there is still little evidence of how the demographic composition by gender/age affects
time allocated in the market, home production, and schooling.
The effect of CCT programs on children’s time allocation has been widely studied
in the literature. In general, CCT programs have been successful at increasing school
enrollment and reducing child work. Frequently, these impacts have been concentrated
among older children. Schultz (2004) shows that the Progresa program in Mexico has a
positive effect on schooling and helps to reduce child work, particularly for boys, while it
also helps decrease domestic work for girls. In Nicaragua, the Red de Proteccion Social
(RPS) reduced child work by 3–5 percentage points among children aged 7–13 (Maluccio
and Flores, 2005). However, some evaluations have found no significant effect on child
labor. For example, an analysis of Bolsa Escola, a CCT program implemented in Brazil,
finds that the program has a big impact on increasing school enrollment but no influence
on child labor (Bourguignon, Ferreira, & Leite, 2003; Cardoso & Souza, 2004). Attanasio
et al. (2006) find that FA has a positive effect on school enrollment, especially in older
children, a negative effect on domestic work for young children, and a neutral effect on
income-generating work. In most cases, there is evidence that the effect of CCT programs
is much stronger on school than on work and that child labor is usually increased at the
expense of child leisure rather than school enrollment.
Very few researchers have studied the time allocation effects of CCT programs on
adults and other members of the household. In practice, CCT programs appear to have
been a modest disincentive or have had nil effects on adult work. Parker and Skoufias
(2000) have used Progresa time use data to study the impacts of the intervention on
adults’ time allocation. The authors found significant effects of the program on adult
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females’ household work, and no effects were observed on adults’ market labor supply.
The data used by Edmonds and Schady (2008) suggest that the Bono de Desarrollo
Humano (BDH) program in Ecuador had no effects on the adult labor supply. Only in
Nicaragua is there some evidence of significant negative effects on adult work. Maluccio
and Flores (2005) show that the RPS resulted in a significant reduction in hours worked
by adult men in the preceding week (by about 6 hours), with no effect among adult
women. The few significant impacts imply adjustments in the intensive margin (hours)
rather than the extensive margin (participation).
The effect of CCT programs on intrahousehold time allocation has not been
widely explored, although it has been recognized that the household is an important
intermediary between aggregate policies and individuals and that any change in the
constraints, technology, or prices facing the household will induce the household to
reallocate resources in order to conform to the optimized allocation. Moreover,
Ardington, Case, and Hosegood’s (2009) results from South Africa indicate that transfers
might affect even more complex within-household interactions, inducing unexpected
labor supply responses. There might also be potential heterogeneity in the effects in the
gender and age dimensions, among others.

Model
Unitary Model
The theoretical basis for understanding the intrahousehold decision making
process of resource allocation has seen three distinct developments: the unitary model,
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bargaining models, and the collective model. In this paper we formulate our hypothesis
under the unitary model framework.
The unitary model considers each household as one decision unit with its own
utility function and preferences. This is observable in the case of common preferences
households, where everyone in the household has the same preferences in making
household decisions, and dictator households, where one person makes all the household
decisions according to his or her preferences without including the preferences of other
household members. In the unitary model, the household decision process can be viewed
as a household utility maximization problem where individuals specialize in certain
activities because of comparative advantages. Because men’s wage rates are higher than
those of women, the model predicts for two-earner households that men specialize in paid
labor and women specialize in household tasks (Becker, 1965, 1991).
A drawback of the unitary approach is that it imposes two restrictions on
household behavior that are often rejected in the empirical literature. The first restriction
is referred to as income pooling and means that it does not matter which member of the
household generates household income. The second restriction is referred to as Slutsky
symmetry and means that marginal compensated wage changes of the spouses have the
same effect on each other’s labor supply. The empirical literature that rejects the unitary
model is substantial (see, among others, Thomas [1990], Browning and Costas [1991],
Browning, Bourguignon, Chiappori, and Lechene [1994], and Browning and Chiappori
[1998]).
A number of empirical studies have attempted to overcome the constraints of the
unitary model through a collective or bargaining approach (Aronsson et al., 2001; Cuesta,
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2004; Haddad, Hoddinott, & Alderman, 1997; Udry, 1996). However, still today there is
an absence of clear conceptual work on a collective model of intrahousehold time
allocation. Such models, while more realistic, have not provided clear directions as to
how intrahousehold allocations will differ when some individual attains more bargaining
strength (Rosenzweig & Schultz, 1984). For that reason, we decide to use a unitary model
for our analysis.
Comparative Statistics
The impact of FA on time use can be analyzed through a family labor supply
model under the unitary household framework, where the time allocation decisions of all
household members are affected by the value of time of all household members. This
model is a simple extension of the one-person model to account for the interrelated
decisions of two or more household´s members concerning labor supply. One basic
difference in empirical implications from the one-person model is the inclusion of other
family members’ wages in an individual’s labor supply function rather than just the
individual’s own wage and the sum of all other income. This allows for interesting
patterns of substitute/complementary relationships among the labor supply functions of
different household members. Equation (9) represents our labor supply equation.
;

s = s(6, t , … , tv , w, , )
Where:
;

s = hours on activity j of individual i
R = non-wage income
t = wage for market work of individual i
P = price of consumption goods
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(9)

A = individual characteristics

A simple comparative statistics analysis allows us to identify the mechanisms
through which the economic incentives raised by a CCT program affect the allocation of
time of all household members. First, we analyze the effect of the program on children’s
time allocation. The price effect is caused by the conditions of the program on
beneficiary household members. The condition on children’s school attendance implies
that the shadow value of children’s time in activities other than school is reduced. This
would tend to imply an increase in school and a reduction in participation in other
activities. On the other hand, households that receive the transfer are less likely to be
dependent on the income of their children and therefore may reduce child work, as
suggested by a number of theoretical models (Basu & Van, 1998; Baland & Robinson,
2000). That is the income effect of the subsidy. If schooling and work are substitutes, the
income effect will reinforce the reduction in work through the substitution effect of the
subsidy, so that it is possible to observe a larger reduction on work than an increase in
school for children. However, time spent in school is ordinarily only a fraction of a day,
so it is possible to increase time dedicated to school by reducing leisure without
necessarily reducing work.
It should be noted that for households that would have sent their children to
school even in the absence of the program, the transfer is effectively an unconditional
transfer that increases household income without altering any relative prices. However,
the subsidy might still bring about changes in household behavior due to the increase in
income. The same effect has the nutrition subsidy.
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The effect of the program on adults’ time allocation has different patterns since
the level of benefits given to households is not affected by household members’ decisions
to work or the income level of the household.53 We assume households have no
incentives to reduce the labor supply in order to meet conditions to be in the program.
Thus, it can be argued that the main effect of FA on adults’ labor supply is a pure income
effect. We assume that an increase in income (through the subsidy) increases the demand
of all normal goods, which includes both consumption and leisure, reducing adult labor
supply. In addition, an additional impact on work and leisure time for women could be
expected, as they must comply with the clinic and school attendance requirements of
family members, reducing their work or leisure time.
Table 21 summarizes our hypothesis, which will be tested in the empirical
equations. Under the unitary model framework we should consider cross-substitution
effects between adults and children. The sign of the cross-substitution effects between
adults and children will be positive or negative depending on whether time allocation of
adults and children are substitutes or complements. For example, the sign of a crosssubstitution effect on the labor participation of an adult will be positive if the adult is
substituting for the child’s work. Because schooling appears as a more attractive option
after receiving the benefit, the shadow value of other activities performed by a child also
decreases, which in turn implies an increase in the adults’ shadow value of time to such
activities. Labor income of working minors is extremely relevant in the analysis of
substitutability and complementarity between adult labor and child labor. Under the

53

Although eligibility is based on a poverty index that includes income along with other
socioeconomic variables, the index is updated every three years and changes are mainly explained by
improvement in housing or significant increases in income. Therefore, we don’t expect households to
reduce labor supply in order to retain eligibility for the program.
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substitutability hypotheses, a drop in adults’ income should be followed an increase in
child labor and children’s labor income.

Table 21. Hypothesis of the impact of the CCT program on the labor supply
Activity

Price Effect

Income Effect

Total Effect

School

+

+

+

Children’s work
(Substitute to school)

–

–

–

Children’s work
(In addition to school)

?

–

?

Adults

None

–

–

Data
The data used in this paper come from the evaluation survey of FA, which was
designed especially for the purposes of impact evaluation of the program. The survey
collected information of individuals and households located in treatment and control
municipalities between 2002 and 2005: the baseline survey was in 2002, the first round
was in 2003, and the second round was in 2005. The surveys contain information on a
wide range of variables, including the household socio-demographic structure, housing
conditions, education and health variables for household members, household
consumption, labor supply, income, and transfers. Thus, we use this valuable balance
panel dataset to model household behavior of eligible households54 and to evaluate the
effect of the program on diverse economic decisions.

54

According to Attanasio et al. (2004), eligible households in the sample are representative of
populations at extreme poverty living in small towns in Colombia.
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For the purposes of this analysis, we use a module on time use data that contains
information on the time each household member older than 10 allocates to each of a total
of 6 activities during the day before the interview.55 These activities were classified into
different work categories: market work, domestic work, schooling, and leisure. Market
work is defined as work for wage or working in their own business; domestic work is
household chores and work without payment; schooling is time attending school and time
doing homework at home; leisure is the difference between 24 hours and the total time
spent on all other reported activities. We exclude from the sample individuals
interviewed on a Sunday or a Monday, since time use patterns over the weekend are
likely to be different from time use patterns during the week, especially for children
attending school. Given that the reference period (one day) is short, we could expect
underestimation on the percentage of individuals who carry out each activity.
The survey also has a module of time use after school for children older than 7
conditional on attending school at the moment of the survey. We use this data to test for
substitution/complementary relation between child work, domestic labor, schooling, and
leisure. Leisure is reported in the survey as time playing and lazing around. This measure
has a comparative advantage over the usual measure of leisure since leisure calculated as
a residual inherits the measurement errors of the other time use components, such as
temporal double counting. Then, this data offers a unique opportunity to identify the
effect of the program on children already attending school and the complementary
relation of schooling with other activities.
55

The 24-hours method can miss activities that do not leave market traces, such as childcare. Another
problem is that respondents usually recall the day in which the activity is predominant and then use the
hours spent on that activity on that day as representative of typical time spent on that activity, thus
frequently resulting in over-reporting.
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The final dataset used for estimation purposes consists of 25,436 individuals in
5,670 eligible poor households, with time use variables for three years, including
pretreatment data. In this subsample, the average household size is about 6 members, and
all the households have children younger than 18 years old. The head of the household is
on average 46 years old, and the average level of education is incomplete primary school
for the head of the household and complete primary for all other individuals. Only 25%
of the households own their house, and 55% of the households are located in poor
neighborhoods.
Table 22 compares mean values of observable household and municipality
characteristics for treatment and control subsamples at the baseline. We expect no
pretreatment differences among municipalities since control municipalities were
randomly selected in order to have a control sample as similar as possible to the treatment
sample. A Hotelling T-squared test of the difference of the means between treatment and
control groups shows balancing of our samples; also, a T-test shows no difference
between the means along most of the observable dimensions included. Therefore, we
assume that our sample resembles a random assignment of the program and we are able
to offset selection bias problems.
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Table 22. Summary statistics by treatment group, sample means
Treatment

Control

T-test
(p_value)

Sex+

0.507

0.518

0.061

Age

27.815

27.885

0.525

Education

3.383

3.352

0.640

Household head+

0.201

0.202

0.873

Female household head+

0.183

0.172

0.109

Single parent+

0.199

0.190

0.340

Health subsidy +

0.641

0.655

0.205

Household head age

46.180

47.267

0.000

Adults age

39.227

40.176

0.000

Household head education

2.811

2.895

0.130

Adults education

3.046

3.118

0.000

Agriculture+

0.109

0.107

0.000

Household size

5.648

5.211

0.243

Own house+

0.287

0.244

0.230

Children 14–17 years old

1.298

1.230

0.000

Children 7–13 years old

1.427

1.493

0.000

Children 0–6 years old

0.782

0.683

0.000

Ln wage men

6.828

6.835

0.260

Ln wage women

2.845

3.004

0.000

Ln wage children

0.435

0.425

0.140

Urban+

0.442

0.562

0.000

Hospitals

0.046

0.042

0.000

Variable
Individuals

Household

Municipality
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Treatment

Control

Health centers

10.182

9.989

T-test
(p_value)
0.608

&o. private schools

3.788

4.632

0.000

&o. public schools

41.334

37.391

0.000

Banks

1.786

0.028

0.000

Strata 1*

0.545

0.524

0.090

Strata 2

0.260

0.266

0.267

Distance to school

13.885

13.657

0.262

Distance to town

48.416

52.407

0.000

Observations

11945

13490

Variable

+

Dummy variables; mean values represent percentages.

*

Strata is a six-level socioeconomic index used in Colombia for the pricing of utilities, where strata 1

corresponds to the lowest income decil in the society.
Notes: The measure of wages is in log and in units of 2002 pesos. Municipality variables indicate the
number of health and educational institutions. Distance to school and town are expressed in minutes.

Time Use of Adults and Children
In this section we provide a general description of labor market activities and time
use from treatment and control groups prior to implementation of the program by
gender/age groups. Table 23 shows labor force participation of women and men by age
group reported during the baseline survey. Participation on each activity is measured by
binary variables indicating individuals that spend more than 1 hour on each specific
activity. As we can observe, communities where FA operates are characterized by very
high labor market participation rates in paid work for men and very low labor market
participation rates for women. Women have higher participation in domestic labor in all
age groups. Participation in school is very similar for girls and boys.
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Table 23. Labor force participation prior to the program, percentages
Age

Gender

Work

Domestic

School

10–17 years

All

32.23

72.67

68.40

Boys

35.48

65.03

71.49

Girls

28.90

80.14

65.18

All

61.54

70.70

27.04

Men

76.26

50.31

27.74

Women

46.11

90.48

27.67

All

50.50

65.12

24.88

Men

62.67

52.10

23.10

Women

33.39

81.06

25.06

18–60 years

>60 years

Table 24 shows daily hours spent by adults in paid and domestic work. Men
spend on average 5 hours on paid work and less than 2 hours on domestic labor. On the
contrary, women spend 5 hours on average on domestic labor and a little less than 2
hours on market work. Individuals older than 60 spend on average 2 hours per day on
domestic labor and 2.5 hours on market work. We observe the same specialization of men
in market work and women in domestic labor that we found on labor force participation
(see Table 23). Pretreatment differences in time allocation between treatment and control
households is controlled in our empirical estimates using DiD matching methods.
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Table 24. Time allocation of adults, number of hours
Group

Hours of
paid
work

Hours of
domestic
labor

Treatment

Control

Baseline

Follow-Up Surveys

Baseline

Follow-Up Surveys

Men 18–60

5.193

5.449

5.346

5.347

Women 18–60

1.622

1.662

1.796

1.744

> 60

2.640

2.304

3.062

2.245

Men 18–60

1.520

1.282

1.028

1.216

Women 18–60

5.107

4.935

4.992

4.884

> 60

2.113

2.265

1.740

2.496

Notes: Numbers of hours spent on each activity the day before the interview. Mean number of hours for the
sample includes those that report zero hours on each activity.

Time Use of Children
Child labor is a major problem in Colombia. According to the FA evaluation
survey, an estimated 15% of children between the ages of 10 and 17 were working at the
moment of the survey and not attending school. Children tend to begin their labor force
participation at early ages, on average at 14 years old, in order to contribute to family
income levels. Children’s wages are very low relative to those of the adults, and most of
them receive no health or unemployment benefits. One of the principal objectives of FA
is to increase children’s enrollment in and attendance at school and thereby reduce this
early labor force participation of children. Table 25 shows the number of hours spends on
activities by children in our sample. Pretreatment differences in time allocation between
treatment and control households is controlled in our empirical estimates using DiD
matching methods.
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Table 25. Time allocation of children, number of hours
Treatment

Hours of
paid work

Hours of
domestic
labor

Hours of
school

Group

Baseline

Boys 10–13

Control

0.139

Follow-Up
Surveys
0.182

Baseline
0.049

Follow-Up
Surveys
0.149

Girls10–13

0.054

0.044

0.024

0.064

Boys 14–17

1.355

1.757

1.125

1.480

Girls 14–17

0.517

0.458

0.332

0.528

Boys 10–13

0.716

0.630

0.461

0.689

Girls 10–13

0.777

0.788

0.465

0.763

Boys 14–17

2.070

1.500

1.527

1.374

Girls 14–17

2.651

2.024

2.138

2.002

Boys 10–13

3.001

3.183

2.859

3.667

Girls 10–13

2.964

3.109

2.949

3.190

Boys 14–17

3.543

3.254

3.223

3.319

Girls 14–17

3.558

4.216

3.732

3.987

Notes: Number of hours spent on each activity the day before the interview. Mean number of hours for the
sample includes those that report zero hours on each activity.

Time use data of children who attend school are available for children between 7
and 17 years old; however, we report statistics for children between 10 and 17 years old
to make data comparable with the overall measure of time use. Participation in paid work,
domestic work, and leisure time activities after school is reported in Table 26, and mean
number of hours on each activity is reported in Table 27. Older children and boys spend
more hours on market labor than younger children and girls. However, children who
attend school spend most of their time on school-related activities, leisure activities, and
domestic activities.
106

Table 26. Labor force participation of children conditional on attending school
Baseline

Follow-Up Surveys

Group

Treatment

Control

Treatment

Control

Boys 10–13

3.13%

3.38%

4.99%

3.42%

Girls 10–13

1.39%

0.85%

1.00%

2.43%

Boys 14–17

12.78%

8.09%

16.74%

10.65%

Girls 14–17

3.85%

1.53%

2.90%

3.30%

Domestic

Boys 10–13

65.14%

59.71%

63.05%

61.14%

labor

Girls 10–13

74.14%

71.91%

70.18%

76.11%

Boys 14–17

70.03%

68.72%

70.79%

71.76%

Girls 14–17

92.63%

90.41%

92.91%

88.21%

Paid work
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Table 27. Time allocation of children conditional on attending school
Baseline

Follow-Up Surveys

Group

Treatment

Control

Treatment

Control

Hours of paid

Boys 10–13

0.076

0.072

0.141

0.079

work

Girls 10–13

0.046

0.016

0.032

0.052

Boys 14–17

0.832

0.144

0.756

0.380

Girls 14–17

0.121

0.028

0.147

0.158

Hours of

Boys 10–13

0.977

0.713

0.940

0.831

domestic labor

Girls 10–13

1.086

0.900

1.191

1.057

Boys 14–17

0.802

0.611

0.649

0.995

Girls 14–17

1.465

1.033

1.725

1.443

Hours of

Boys 10–13

1.350

1.282

1.424

1.390

study

Girls 10–13

1.528

1.437

1.537

1.545

Boys 14–17

1.091

0.986

1.600

1.618

Girls 14–17

1.413

1.280

1.817

1.870

Hours of

Boys 10–13

2.524

2.493

2.925

3.082

leisure

Girls 10–13

2.342

2.441

2.261

2.740

Boys 14–17

1.487

1.412

1.422

1.551

Girls 14–17

1.430

1.455

1.085

1.215

Notes: Number of hours spent on each activity the day before the interview. Mean number of hours for the
sample includes those that report zero hours on each activity.

Income and Wages
This paper analyzes not only the time allocation of household members but also
the interrelations among market wage rates and the time allocated by adults and children
by including individuals´ and other household members’ wages as controls on time use
equations.
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Income and wages in Colombia differ greatly among gender/age groups even
though our sample is limited to poor households in Colombia. Income in our data is the
sum of all labor income and non-wage income. Labor income is income from an
employer or their own business; non-wage income is income from rents, pensions, and
other government transfers. As we can observe from Table 28, labor income represents a
large percentage of total income, especially for men and boys, while non-wage income
represents almost 23% of girls’ income.
Table 28. Monthly average income at baseline
Income

Labor Income

Hourly Wage

215,779

&on-Wage
Income
5,230

Adult males

221,009

Adult females

64,539

58,061

6,478

5,073

Boys

13,681

12,912

769

3,267

Girls

3,128

2,552

576

1,582

6,503

Note: Income measures are deflated to the 2002 price level in Colombian pesos.

Empirical Model
The estimation of the impact of FA on labor force participation and time use is
based on the difference-in-difference (DiD) estimator. This estimator is based on
comparing differences between the treatment and control groups before and after the
beginning of the program. It offers the advantage that any pre-program differences
between the treatment and control groups are eliminated in the estimation of impacts,
under the assumption that any unobserved heterogeneity between the treatment and
control groups is fixed over time. We use a number of control variables that may be
useful for reducing any remaining statistical bias.
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The following regression equation defines a DiD model that lets us estimate
various difference estimators allowing for individual, household, and locality observed
characteristics:
*; =  + ∑  x + ∑  d; x + :; ; + ;

(9)

*; denotes the value of the outcome of interest for individual i and household j in
period t; d; is a binary variable taking the value of 1 if the household resides in a
treatment community and 0 if it resides in a control community; x are binary variables
equal to 1 for each round of the follow-up surveys and the value of 0 for the baseline
survey. The vector X summarizes individual, household, and municipality characteristics,
and ; is an error term summarizing the influence of random disturbances. The
parameters of interest are  , which indicate the effect of the program on the outcome for
each follow-up survey.
In this research we find unbiased estimates of the effects of the program by preprocessing our dataset with matching non-parametric methods and then applying
parametric techniques to increase efficiency. This procedure makes parametric models
produce more accurate and considerably less model-dependent causal inferences (Ho,
Imai, King, & Stuart, 2007). First, we use a non-parametric kernel propensity score with
replacement to match treatment and control observations. We use matching weights of
the control observations for estimations of the parametric equations. Second, we estimate
the parametric specification of Equation (9), restricting the analysis to individuals in the
common support56 to minimize any bias due to extrapolation. The standard errors were
estimated taking into account the clustered nature of the sample. Finally, we report a bias-

56

The region over which treated individuals have a counterpart in the group of controls.
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corrected matching estimator proposed by Imbens (2004) which adjusts the difference
within the matches for the differences in their covariate values
We estimate impact on the following outcomes: hours of paid work, domestic
work, school, and leisure. We estimate a Tobit model when the dependent variable is the
amount of hours spent on each activity and ordinary least squares when the dependent
variable is leisure hours.
For the empirical estimation we separately consider time use by gender and age
groups. For adults we consider hours on paid work and domestic labor separately for men
and women between 18 and 60 years old and for individuals older than 60. In the case of
children, we have 4 groups: boys and girls between 10 and 13 years old and boys and
girls between 13 and 17 years old.
To check cross-substitution effects we estimate the interrelationships between
adult male, adult female, and child market wage rates and time allocated to work,
domestic labor, and schooling by boys and girls. Assuming that utility functions of the
household members are weakly separable, we estimate labor supply equations for
children as a function of own wages and other household members’ wages. We also
assume that transfer from the program is pooled at the household level and has the same
effect as non-wage income. We use parameter estimates of wage and income variables to
understand the substitutibility and complementarity between child labor and adult labor.
Control Variables
We use a number of different individual, household, and municipality variables
likely to influence children’s and adults’ time allocation. With respect to individual
characteristics, regressions include education level, age, age squared, non-labor income,
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and wages of all household members on market activities. Parental and household
characteristics include household head and spouse education levels, the age of the mother
and father , whether the occupation of the household head is in agriculture, whether the
household head is a woman, the number of children between 0 and 6 years old
(potentially beneficiaries of nutrition subsidy), the number of children between 7 and 11
years old (potentially beneficiaries of education subsidy for elementary), the number of
children between 12 and 17 years old (potentially beneficiaries of education subsidy for
secondary), household size, whether the household owns a house, whether the household
has health insurance, the log of the potential FA cash transfer, the non-wage income of
the household, and wages of all members of the household.
Local or municipality characteristics include variables used to select the sample of
treatment and control municipalities: number of hospitals; public schools for elementary
and secondary education; banks; travel time to the nearest school; travel time to the
nearest town; population; whether it is located in an urban or a rural area; average wages
for males, females, and children at the municipality level; dummies for socioeconomic
strata were the household is located inside the municipality; and dummies for
geographical economic regions in Colombia. These variables are very important for the
matching methods since selection of treatment and control samples were based on these
variables.
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Results
In this section we turn to the results of the impacts of FA on time use for adults
and children by gender/age groups and analyze the possible substitution or
complementary relationship between child labor and adult labor supply.
Impacts on Children’s Time Use
Table 29 reports the estimated impact of the FA program on boys’ and girls’ total
schooling time, market work, and domestic work for young children (10–13 years old)
and for older children (14–17 years old). For each activity, we report the estimated
coefficient of the treatment variable, the parameter γ from equation (9) for the second
round of the survey, which is the average increase/decrease in the number of hours
allocated to each activity if a household is a beneficiary of the program with respect of
not being in the program. All the effects are estimated for those individuals within the
common support. The estimated impact of the program in this table reflects the income
and substitution effect of the CCT program.
Table 29. Impact of the program on hours of child time uses, Tobit model
&umber of Hours

Boys 10–13

Girls 10–13

Boys 14–17

Girls 14–17

School

2.182***

0.717***

2.269***

2.577**

(0.31)

(0.21)

(0.66)

(0.95)

1.855

0.045

–1.408*

–0.799

(1.02)

(0.05)

(0.65)

(0.54)

–0.545***

–0.355**

–0.524*

0.195

(0.20)

(0.16)

(0.25)

(0.31)

Paid work

Domestic labor

Note: Estimations are the ATT of the program FA. Imbens´ standard in parentheses. Each individual
coefficient is statistically significant at the *10%, **5%, or ***1% level.
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According to the results, the FA program has increased schooling hours for all
children by 2 hours on average; has decreased domestic labor, particularly for young
children; and has significantly decreased paid work for older children. We observe that
increased schooling hours displace domestic and income labor. These results are in line
with previous studies that have estimated the effect of the program on schooling and
working activities (Attanasio et al., 2006).
We also estimate the effect of the program on time use for children who were
attending school previous to the program. For that, we use a module that asks for hours in
activities different to attending school. These effects are very interesting since enrollment
rates were relatively high during the baseline survey (around 85% of the children). In
addition, time use data collected for this sample of children lead us to understand
substitutibility or complementarity of different activities with school attendance.
Table 30. Impact of the program on hours of child time uses for children who were
attending school prior to the program, Tobit model
&umber of Hours

Boys 10–13

Girls 10–13

Boys 14–17

Girls 14–17

Paid work

–0.083

–0.182*

–0.330*

–0.371

(0.17)

(0.08)

(0.16)

(0.28)

0.027

0.504*

0.343

–0.908

(0.11)

(0.22)

(0.35)

(0.51)

–0.036

–0.029

–0.678

0.056

(0.35)

(0.30)

(0.40)

(0.22)

Playing and leisure

–0.078

–0.302*

0.279*

–0.618

(excludes sleeping time)

(0.34)

(0.17)

(0.12)

(0.51)

Domestic labor

Doing homework and studying

Note: Estimations are the ATT of the program FA. Imbens´ standard errors in parentheses. Each individual
coefficient is statistically significant at the *10%, **5%, or ***1% level.
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Results in Table 30 show that for children who were previously enrolled in
school, the program has no effect on activities complementary to school. It also has very
important policy implications, as we show that the same program without a conditionality
on school attendance will not have an effect on schooling time. Nevertheless, the effect of
the subsidy is reflected in reduced working hours and leisure time for young girls, which
is compensated by increased domestic labor. The program also has a negative effect on
working hours for older children, which is compensated by increased leisure time. In
general, the effect of the subsidy reduces paid working time for children enrolled in
school, as households are receiving extra income. This effect goes in line with our
predictions. However, the effect of the program on domestic labor is more difficult to
understand, as other household members should be doing this work.
According to the results shown in Table 29 and Table 30, domestic labor
decreased at the expense of schooling time for boys who were not attending school before
the program, but it has increased domestic labor for girls already enrolled in school at the
expense of their leisure time. However, the increase of domestic labor for young girls is
just a fraction of the total reduction of domestic labor by all children. Therefore, we
expect adults to increase time on domestic chores. We test this in the following section.
Finally, FA does appear to have negative significant effects on leisure time of
younger girls but a positive effect on leisure time of boys. It is interesting to observe how
household preferences in leisure time allocation among household members differ by sex.
Our results suggest higher preferences for leisure time for boys than for girls. However,
this can be also explained by wage differences among sexes. From these results, we can
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conclude that leisure is a substitute for work and domestic labor, and all work can be
complementary of schooling.
Impacts on Adult’s Time Use
Table 31 presents the results for adults in terms of the effect of FA on paid work
and domestic labor. We expect the impact of FA on all work to be negative if leisure is a
normal good. Nevertheless, we observe opposite behavior: hours of paid work increase
for male adults, and hours of domestic labor increase for female adults. This means that
adults could be substituting for hours of work of children in all work activities. For
instance, there may have been a substitution between male adults and boys in incomegenerating labor but a complementary relationship between women and girls in domestic
labor. Overall, the results do not show significant impacts of FA on the work time of old
men or women. We conclude that there is evidence to support the hypothesis that FA has
reduced the leisure time of adults.
Table 31. Impact of the program on hours of adults’ time uses by age/sex groups, Tobit
model

Paid work

Domestic labor

Leisure

Males 18–60

Females 18–60

>60

0.889***

0.174

0.583

(0.27)

(0.19)

(0.09)

–0.406***

0.274*

–0.092

(0.15)

(0.20)

(0.39)

–0.209*

–0.159*

0.321

(0.13)

(0.07)

(0.24)

Note: Estimations are the ATT of the program FA. Imbens´ standard errors in parentheses. Each individual
coefficient is statistically significant at the *10%, **5%, or ***1% level.
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Cross-Substitution Effects
To better understand the cross-substitution effects of the CCT program between
parents and their children, we include own wages and other household members’ wages
in the labor supply equations estimated for children and adults. We also include the
amount of the subsidy as non-wage income. Results suggest the importance of the
opportunity cost of time in intrahousehold time use.
The signs and significance of the wage coefficient estimates turned out to be
robust across specifications. We observe that increases in the opportunity cost of time of
one family member not only affect the amount of time devoted to various activities by
that family member, mainly reducing their hours in market work, but also have a
significant effect on the time allocation of other family members.
In general, we observe that own wage has a negative effect on all activities. In
addition, children’s wage does not affect male adults’ time allocation. We also observe
some complementarity of hours of work between children and female adults of the
household. On the other hand, male wages do not affect the time allocation of women,
while female wages do affect the time allocation of men. We can conclude that hours in
labor markets between males and females are substitutes.

Conclusions
The estimates presented in this study provide some evidence of the intrahousehold
time allocation effect of a CCT program in Colombia. The analysis comprises the
intended effects on children’s time use and the potential scope of unintended labor supply
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effects among adults, which is especially relevant given the increasing coverage of the
program throughout the country.
Based on our results, we prove that the program is effective at increasing
schooling time for all children, displacing income and domestic labor. However, we find
that the effect of the program on schooling of children already enrolled in school is
insignificant. We also observe some patterns of substitution between activities for
children attending school as a result of the program. We find that the program increases
the leisure time of boys, displacing paid work, but reduces the leisure time of girls,
increasing domestic labor.
The study also examines the effect of the program on adult’s time use. The most
surprising result is the increased labor supply of adults in the program. Particularly, we
find that males increased paid work at the expense of domestic labor and that females
increased domestic labor at the expense of leisure time. Neither economic theory nor
previous evidence explains such behavior. We provide some explanations, as this effect
was robust across several specifications. First, the income elasticity of leisure may be
very low for extremely poor households. This is a realistic explanation as the estimated
coefficient for the FA subsidy in our different regressions, when statistically significant,
is negative and relatively low57. Second, the positive impact of CCT programs on
children’s school attendance might free time previously spent in childcare, further
reducing the cost of work for adults (Baker, Gruber, & Milligan, 2005). If hours on labor
markets between males and females are substitutes and hours of work between girls and

57

Results indicate that a 10% increase in FA subsidy decreases boys’ and males’ labor supply by
0.4%.
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female adults are complementary, as our estimates suggest, this is a very plausible
explanation.
There are other reasons that might help explain why there have not been large
disincentives to adult´s labor supply associated with CCT programs, but these reasons are
not likely in our specific program or need further research to be proven. First, for some
households the reduction in income from child work and the increase in school
expenditures associated with the additional school enrollment might offset the amount of
the transfer (Fiszbein, Schady, Ferreira, Kelleher, Olinto, & Skoufias, 2009). We consider
this is not the case in our sample, as average household transfer is almost equal to
average child income; however, we might need to test for increased schooling costs.
Second, it is possible that adults would not change their labor supply if households
perceived transfers to be temporary rather than permanent (Fiszbein et al., 2009). We
think this is not very probable in this case, as FA has been continuously expanding since
its implementation in 2002 and the government has promoted it as a permanent program
for the poor. Third and finally, it is possible that the program has brought changes to
wages in the market, changing work incentives. For the purpose of this analysis we have
assumed that the program has not affected market wages. Nonetheless, it is
recommendable that future research looks at the potential general equilibrium effects of
the program, as this could have important consequences for the interpretation of the
effects of the program on different outcomes.
This research provides relevant results for our understanding of labor markets in
general and especially in how the role of the family interacts with public interventions
such as CCT programs. Results have large implications on economic policy, as

119

intrahousehold time allocation is crucial to comprehend the income generation process of
the poor and to assess the overall well-being of beneficiaries of the program.
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